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A CHILD OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: RACE AS A FACTOR
IN ADOPTION AND CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
SUSAN J. GRossmAN*
While adoptions concern only a limited number of individuals in a soci-
ety, the handling of the matter of the disposition of a human life can
both reflect that society as well as act back upon it.
D. Fanshel, A Study in
Negro Adoption 80 (1957).
I. INTRODUCTION
N 1944, Gunnar Myrdal examined the "Negro problem" in America and
characterized it as "the American dilemma," the "ever-raging conflict" be-
tween the white American's national and Christian values on the one hand, and
his prejudices, jealousies, interests, and wants on the other.1 The question of race
as a factor in adoption and custody proceedings represents an offshoot of this
dilemma which Myrdal never considered but might easily have predicted.
Pitted against one another, are two sets of values: one, vesting in home and
family great significance for the development of the child and for the health of
society as a whole; the other, formed by prejudice and fear, denying that home
and family to a child of a different race.
The family has always been viewed as a crucial element in American society.
Despite repeated pronouncements that the American family is in a state of dis-
integration, in many ways "the nuclear family has become more important" in
recent years.2 "By and large, ... our times are characterized by an increasing
concern for strong parent-child relationships" and "increasing attention to ...
the welfare of the child ." Thus, where a family is broken by divorce, the aim
of a custody proceeding is, in theory, to place the child in the best home-life
situation possible under the circumstances. Where a child is totally bereft of
a family (because of illegitimate birth to a mother unwilling to raise him, for
example), adoption is generally considered the best of several alternatives. In-
deed, adoption's greatest value "lies in restoring to the child the security of per-
manent family life."1
4
Custody and adoption decisions have not been left, in our society, to the
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1. G. Myrdal, Introduction to An American Dilemma at lxxi (20th anniversary ed.
1962).
2. J. Udry, The Social Context of Marriage 10, 18 (1966). (Emphasis in original.)
3. C. Foote, R. Levy & F. Sander, Cases and Materials on Family Law 5 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Foote, Levy & Sander].
4. 1 M. Schapiro, A Study of Adoption Practice 16 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1
Schapiro].
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whims of private ordering.5 The disposition of a child is viewed as something in
which the whole of society has a serious interest, and, as a result, it is hedged by
social and legal restrictions reflecting the notions of social workers, judges, leg-
islators, and ultimately the community itself. Like anything else subject to such
influences, the benevolent goals of custody and adoption proceedings are some-
times twisted in response to them. One victim of this distortion may be the white
child ordered to leave his mother merely because she has chosen a Negro as her
second husband. Another victim is the unwanted Negro or part-Negro child. A
home for him with white adoptive parents may be prohibited by statute, denied
by the courts, discouraged by social agencies-or it may simply raise a sufficient
number of eyebrows in the community to make its happening quite unlikely.
Is this situation a cause for concern? It may be, at least in the area of
adoption, as an examination of the broad social problem involved there indicates.
The demand by white couples for adoptable white children, once very great,
has declined in recent years as the number of white children available for adop-
tion has increased relative to the number of prospective parents. Yet even today it
seems safe to say that almost any white child released for adoption can be placed
in a satisfactory home without great difficulty.6 At the same time, the number of
Negro and part-Negro children who might be adopted has also risen-but these
children's prospects for adoption are much worse7 A host of factors are credited
with contributing to this result.
First, the illegitimacy rate among Negroes is relatively high. While this rate
has increased among both whites and Negroes in recent years, the increase among
whites has been from 2 percent in 1940 to 3.07 percent in 1963, compared with
the increase from 16.8 percent to 23.6 percent among Negroes.8 Although for
various reasons unwed Negro mothers may want to keep their children more
often than unwed white mothers, there is evidence indicating that many more
would give up their children if they knew that adoptive homes were available.0
Social agencies, which handle most non-relative adoptions, service few Ne-
gro unmarried mothers in proportion to their numbers. As a consequence, some
agencies have never handled Negro children, or they have handled very few. This
situation-although currently undergoing some change-has reinforced the Ne-
gro mother's tendency to keep her illegitimate children, even when she doesn't
want to.'0
Negro married couples, who would be the most likely adoptive parents for
S. See the discussion of this concept in H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 207-209
(tent. ed. 1958).
6. Foote, Levy & Sander 506-507.
7. 3 M. Schapiro, A Study of Adoption Practice 9-10 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 3
Schapiro]; Herzog & Bernstein, Why So Few Negro Adoptions?, 12 Children 14 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Herzog & Bernstein].
8. Office of Policy Planning & Research, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Negro Family: The
Case for National Action 7 (1965) [hereinafter cited as The Negro Family].
9. Herzog & Bernstein 14-15.
10. Id.; 1 Schapiro 49-54.
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Negro children,'1 adopt children to a relatively smaller extent than do white cou-
ples. The primary explanation appears to lie in the generally lower degree of fi-
nancial resources in the Negro community. 12 One student of the problem con-
cludes that the amount of income is probably less significant a consideration than
the stability of employment and income.' 3 Allied to economic insecurity may be
a generally uneasy feeling about the future: "[T] o attain that state of mind that
makes it possible to contemplate the future with any measure of equanimity is
difficult for everyone these days-and perhaps more so for Negroes.... ,,14
Another probable factor is the relatively high degree of family instability
among Negroes. One recent study has noted some relevant statistics: "Nearly a
quarter of Negro women living in cities who have ever married are divorced,
separated, or are living apart from their husbands." While in 1940, both whites
and Negroes had a divorce rate of 2.2 percent, by 1964 "the white rate had risen
to 3.6 percent, but the nonwhite rate had reached 5.1 percent. . .. ,"15 This
high proportion of marital instability of course reduces the number of Negro
couples who might adopt a child. 16
There may also be significance for adoption in that "the law represents to
the Negro a punitive power" and that previous experience with social agencies
has in many cases adversely affected the Negro's opinion of agencies.T7 Agencies'
themselves have also been blamed for insisting upon unrealistic standards for
Negro applicants, and for a number of other practices which have, in general,
inhibited adoption by Negro couples.' 8
Whatever the causes, the result is that "a much smaller percentage of
Negro children is adopted than white children."' 9 There may be in this result
"solid grounds for concern," for where a child is neither adopted nor absorbed
into the mother's family without difficulty, he will remain indefinitely in foster or
institutional care or will be raised by a mother "unable or unwilling" to care
for him adequately. ° The children who grow up in such environments are likely
to have less chance "to develop into normal, integrative personalities."'21
11. See the discussion of "matching" in infraSec. II(B) (2) pp. 318-25.
12. 3 Schapiro 11; Herzog & Bernstein 16-17.
13. D. Fanshel, A Study in Negro Adoptions 83 (1957). But the same author also com-
ments that economic "marginality is experienced differently by individuals" and that fur-
ther analysis is required to determine why "some couples, whose economic circumstances
parallel those who have been able to move into adoption, have made the choice not to
have a child." Id. at 67.
14. Deasy & Quinn, The Urban Negro and Adoption of Children, Child Welfare (1962),
quoted in Herzog & Bernstein 16.
15. The Negro Family 6-8.
16. Indeed, when only husband-wife families with heads under 45 years of age were
compared, the rate of adoptions by Negroes was approximately as high as that by whites.
When families with incomes under $3000 were excluded from this group, the Negro rate was
even higher than the white. Herzog & Bernstein 17.
17. 3 Schapiro 12.
18. See id.; D. Fanshel, s=pra note 13, at 84-85; Herzog & Bernstein 16.
19. 3 Schapiro 9.
20. Herzog & Bernstein 14.
21. Address by N. Jackson, National Conference on Adoption, January, 1955, quoted
in 3 Schapiro 10.
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Recognizing that attempts to increase the number of Negro adoptions
have not met with much success in the past, some have suggested such possible
alternative approaches as modifications in agency policies and practices, e.g.,
subsidizing a child in a Negro home lacking nothing but financial ability, and
the expansion of resources other than adoption, e.g., improving group care.22
Others, however, have proposed that greater attention be given to "the possi-
bility of interracial placement. ' 23 As one worker in the field has phrased it:
white adoptive homes for Negro children are "the obvious conclusion.1 24
This proposal is a controversial one. It calls for an examination of current
law and practice in the area of adoption and in the related field of custody
determinations. It also requires careful consideration of the social and psycholog-
ical factors inherently involved, and a discussion of the constitutional questions
raised. In analyzing these considerations, the following theses will, in general,
be maintained: That interracial adoption must not be illegal under statutory
law, must not be denied by the courts in the absence of compelling reasons to
support such a denial, and must receive continued encouragement from social
agencies; further, that, in a custody determination, a difference in race must not
override all other considerations. It is submitted that, as a result, the development
of the children involved will be, on balance, somewhat more sound than other-
wise, and that society as a whole will benefit.
II. PRESENT LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Statutory Law
Adoption "aims at creating a parent-child relationship-usually biologically
accomplished-through the medium of law .... ," Because it was unknown at
common law, adoption was at first legal only in those states (notably, Louisiana
and Texas) whose law was based on the civil law system, which has made provi-
sion for adoption since the Roman era. In 1851, Massachusetts enacted a statute
generally recognized as the first adoption law, and the trend towards the enact-
ment of adoption statutes had begun. Today every state has such a statute.20
Adoption law, as the "creature of statute," varies considerably from state to
state. Most jurisdictions, however, follow a fairly general procedure which can be
briefly summarized.2 7 The first step in the adoption process is the selection of the
child to be adopted. A significant proportion of all adoption proceedings are adop-
tions by relatives, usually a stepparent. In 1964, 46 percent of the adoption pe-
titions granted in the United States were granted to relatives of the child.
28 Most
22. See, e.g., Herzog & Bernstein 17-18.
23. Letter from Charles B. Olds, Executive Director, Children's Home Society of
Minnesota, commenting on Herzog & Bernstein in Readers' Exchange, 12 Children 128 (1965).
24. Letter from Los Angeles County Foster Home Recruitment Director, id.
25. 1 Schapiro 12.
26. Id. at 17-19.
27. This summary is, except where otherwise noted, based upon M. Leavy, The Law
of Adoption passim (2d ed. 1954).
28. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1966, at 308
(87th ed. 1966).
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non-relative adoptions-about two-thirds-are arranged by public or private
agencies.29 The remainder consists of "independent placements," which in some
jurisdictions are restricted or virtually prohibited to prevent the possibility of
unhappy placements by "careless and untrained" persons.o Bearing upon the
selection of a child are state statutes, as well as agency practices and judicial
sentiments, regarding "who may adopt" and "who may be adopted." There are
varying requirements in these two areas as to age, race, religion, residence, and
other qualifications of the parties.
The legal proceeding is generally begun by the filing of a petition, a "formal
demand for the issuance by the court of the adoption order." The petition must
contain certain information required by the state's adoption statute, and is usu-
ally filed in a probate, juvenile, or family court, or other courts of similar func-
tions. Where the child does not reside in the same state as the adopting parents,
a venue question may arise: about half the states require that proceedings be
brought in the petitioners' home county, while the other states generally allow a
choice between the child's and the parents' home county. Consents to the adop-
tion must usually have been obtained from the natural parent(s) or other simi-
larly-interested parties.
After the petition is filed, the case is set for hearing. In most states, an in-
vestigation by an agency of the suitability of the adoption is required, and the
report that results is considered at the hearing. The court's guiding principle is
"the best interests of the child." Approval by the court means a temporary or
final order of adoption, and the procedure, for most cases, is completed.
Where a court is called upon to determine the custody of children following
separation or divorce of their parents, "the guiding shibboleth," as in adoption,
is the child's best interests. The criteria weighed by the courts include, pre-
eminently, the "fitness" of the contestants, while subsidiary factors such as age
(and sometimes preference) of the child, and financial standing, race, and re-
ligion of the contestants have also been considered. Most jurisdictions give a
statutory preference to the mother as a custodian for young children, while the
father is sometimes preferred for teen-age children, especially boys.31
American jurisdictions treat the factor of race in a variety of ways in their
adoption statutes: (1) the statute may expressly prohibit interracial adoption;
(2) the statute may mention race as a relevant consideration; (3) the statute
may fail to make any mention of race at all.
32
29. Id.
30. Foote, Levy & Sander 546.
31. Id. at 851-53.
32. The statutes indentified infra within categories (1) and (2) are referred to in id.
at 526; M. Cohen, Race, Creed and Color in Adoption Proceedings 3 (1964); and/or J.
Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law 399 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Greenberg].
As a means of enforcing their miscegenation statutes, some states also prohibited the
adoption of illegitimate children whose parents could not have lawfully married in that state.
See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 10-2585 (1962). Mixed illegitimate children were therefore una-
doptable by either race in those states. Note, Adoption in South Carolina, 9 S.C.L.Q. 210
(1957).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
(1) Statutes Prohibiting Interracial Adoption
The adoption statutes of two states, Louisiana and Texas, expressly prohibit
interracial adoption. 33 The fact that adoption law in these two states is based on
the civil law may make this finding less than coincidental. It seems likely that
here, in the civil law tradition, codification of this prohibition has occurred, while
the legislatures of other states with a similar outlook on this issue have, in the
common-law tradition, relied upon the courts to interpret their more generally-
worded statutes to produce the same result.
(2) Statutes Making Race a Relevant Consideration
Two other states' statutes provide for specific consequences to follow at-
tempts to create an interracial home under certain circumstances, although in-
terracial adoption as such is not expressly prohibited. South Carolina's statute84
makes it unlawful for a white person having custody of a white child to give the
child "permanently into the custody, control, maintenance or support of a negro."
While this is a misdemeanor, characterized as an "offense against public policy,"
there is apparently no provision to the contrary, i.e., making unlawful the giving
of a Negro child to a white. In Missouri,35 the adoption of a child who proves to
be of a race whose members persons of the adopting parents' race are prohibited
by law from marrying, can be annulled by the courts. This provision is appar-
ently discretionary and, hinged directly to the Missouri miscegenation law, has
probably fallen with it. 6
Ten other states require: (a) that the race of the parties be considered either
by those making the investigation prepared for the court, or by the court itself;
8
7
or (b) that the race of the child, in some cases the race of the adoptive parents,
and occasionally the race of the natural parents, be stated on the petition for
adoption.38 The significance of these statutes would appear to be that the agen-
cies and the courts involved in adoption proceedings in these states are made
33. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:422 (1965): "A single person over the age of twenty-one
years, or a married couple jointly, may petition to adopt any child of his or their race." Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 46a(8), 46b-1(4) (1959): "No white child (adult) can be adopted
by a negro person, nor can a negro child (adult) be adopted by a white person."
A Texas court has recently held its statute unconstitutional "as violative of . .. the
Texas Constitution, as well as .. .Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution."
The case arose when a Negro Army sergeant, seeking to adopt the white children of his
white wife, had his petition for adoption denied solely on the basis of the statute. Matter of
Gomez, Tex. Ct. of Civ. App., 8th Dist., Nov. 1, 1967 (per curiam), 36 U.S.L.W. 1085,
2339-40 (Dec. 12, 1967)."
34. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-553 (1962).
35. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 453.130 (1956).
36. See Cook & Eppenberger, Adoption Act, J. Mo. B. 228 (1948).
37. Ga. Code Ann. § 74-411 (1964); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 210, § SA (1958); Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 27.3178(545) (1957 Supp.); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 461:2 (1955); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 3107.05E (Page 1953).
38. Fla. Stat. Ann. tit. 6 § 72.12 (1964); Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 3-115, 3-116 (1946); Okla.
Stat. tit. 10, § 60112(1) (c) (1961); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 1(d) (1963); Wash, Rev. Code
Ann. § 26.32.060 (1961).
South Dakota's statute, S.D. Code § 14.0406 (1960 Supp.), requires this information
on the order of adoption.
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aware of the legislative decision that race is a factor which must be considered
in the adoptive process. Race is not the only factor pointed out in this fashion,
however, and the courts are free to interpret this legislative language as they
see fit.
(3) Statutes Making No Mention of Race
The adoption statutes in a majority of American jurisdictions make no men-
tion of race. In these states, therefore, whether or not interracial adoption can
be accomplished is ultimately determined by the courts-in particular, by each
individual judge's own interpretation of the "best interests" of the child. Sig-
nificantly involved in this process are the public and private adoption agencies in
the state. In view of the high incidence of agency-placed adoptions, and the usu-
ally high degree of reliance placed on agency recommendations by the courts, the
outlook of these agencies may decide-regardless of the attitudes of the judicia-
ry-whether interracial adoption occurs to any substantial extent or (especially
where state law prohibits independent placement by other than close relatives)
whether it takes place at all.
Statutory provisions concerning custody apparently do not deal specifically
with such factors as race but leave the entire decision to the courts under the
general "best interests" standard. (Of course, in those states which have prohib-
ited miscegenation up to the present day, a white mother's remarriage to a Negro
has been impossible within the state, so the question was unlikely to arise where




In the two states where statutes have expressly prohibited interracial adop-
tion, judicial practice has presumably followed the statutory law.3 9 But what
about judicial practice elsewhere? It is difficult to know much about working
judicial usage in this area because few reported cases deal with the question of
interracial adoption.40 Although cases raising the question are not numerous, a
39. The writer has uncovered no cases on this point. But cf. Hodge's Heirs v. Kell, 125
La. 87, 51 So. 77 (1910), where a testator's adoption of his illegitimate children by his
"colored concubine" was upheld when collaterally attacked, since the parents could have
legally married at the time the children were conceived (prior to the enactment of the
state's miscegenation statute) ; the children could therefore have been legitimized by acknowl-
edgment and were consequently adoptable. Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 905, 909 (1957).
40. Greenberg, noting this at 351, attributes it to the infrequent occurrence of such
adoptions, but other contributing factors may be involved. For one thing, petitions for
adoption are rarely denied, especially where a licensed agency has made the placement,
supervised its consequences for a period of time, and recommended approval of the petition
to the court. Where an interracial adoption receives this sort of sanction, probably few
judges will ignore the agency's work and decide singlehandedly that the placement is ad-
verse to the child's "best interest."
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consideration of racial factors appears to be "standard practice" in most states,
even in the absence of any mention of race in their statutes.
41
In the South it is commonplace that many laws which are "fair on their
face" in the statute books are quite different when enforced. Thus, while most of
the Southern states do not specifically forbid interracial adoption by statute, one
authority has written that such adoptions "will rarely, if ever, be approved in the
courts.. .. ,42 Indeed, it would be absurd to imagine that the courts of a state
like Mississippi, whose statute calls only for
the material facts upon which the court may determine whether the
child is a proper subject for adoption, whether the petitioners or peti-
tioner are suitable parents for the child, whether the adoption is to its
best interest, and any other facts or circumstances which may be ma-
terial to the proposed adoption, 43
would enforce that provision to make the creation of an interracial family pos-
sible. It is probably safe to say that miscegenation statutes have gone hand in
hand with the denial of interracial adoptions in the courts: the policy of the
former necessarily precluded the latter as well"
The Southern courts, however, are not alone in reading racial considerations
into their adoption laws. It has been noted, for example, that Iowa's statute
"contains no restriction relative to race or religion, but these factors are con-
sidered by social workers and judges.... . ,'14 Apparently, as one writer has com-
mented, even in America's more "enlightened" communities, judges, "being ...
very much aware of the importance of skin color in American society, . . , tread
lightly in cases involving interracial adoption or custody."40 A review of some
cases which have been reported in the area may be helpful at this point.
Perhaps the leading case dealing with the question of interracial adoption
(although somewhat indirectly) is the 1955 decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, In Re Adoption of a Minor.47 In that
case a child had been born out of wedlock to a white mother in 1949. In 1951
the mother married a Negro, who later petitioned to adopt the child with the
mother's consent. (The white father's whereabouts were unknown.) Although
the child lived with his mother's husband since the marriage, and they had "sup-
ported and carefully reared the child as their own," Judge Holtzoff denied the
petition in the district court, writing:
Ordinarily such an adoption [of a child born out of wedlock]
should be not only approved but encouraged. [But in this case a] prob-
lem arises out of the fact that the stepfather is a colored man, while the
41. Greenberg 351 n.48. See also M. Leavy, supra note 27, at 32; Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d
905, 909 (1957).
42. M. Leavy, supra note 27, at 32.
43. Miss. Code Ann. § 1269-05 (1956).
44. For corroboration of this point see infra Sec. B(2) pp. 318-25.
45. Uhlenhopp, Adoption in Iowa, 40 Iowa L. Rev. 228, 234 (1955).
46. Are Interracial Homes Bad for Children, Ebony, March, 1963, in Marriage Across
the Color Line 68 (C. Larrson ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Larrson].
47. 228 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (Bazelon, J.).
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mother and boy are white people. This situation gives rise to a difficult
social problem. The boy when he grows up might lose the social status
of a white man by reason of the fact that by record his father will be a
negro. I feel the court should not fashion the child's future in this
manner.
48
The appellate court held that denial of the petition was erroneous and ordered
that it be granted. The opinion, written by Judge Bazelon, noted that under the
District of Columbia statute the court's primary duty was "to determine the best
interests of the infant." Denial could not rest
on a distinction between the "social status" of whites and Negroes.
There may be reasons why a difference in race... may have relevance
in adoption proceedings. But that factor alone cannot be decisive in
determining the child's welfare. It does not permit a court to ignore all
other relevant considerations. Here we think those other considerations
have controlling weight.49
Judge Bazelon noted that the child was happy and receiving loving care in-the
home-and would continue to live there in any case. Thus, denying the petition
for adoption would serve only to deprive him of legitimate status.50
Two other recent cases more nearly approach the focal problem of adoption
of a nonwhite child by white parents. In one, Matter of the Adoption of Baker,51
a probate court judge in Cleveland, Ohio, denied an adoption petition because of
the different racial backgrounds of the parties. The judge reportedly said, "The
good Lord created five races and if he intended to have only one, he would have
done so. It was never intended that the races should be mixed."5 2 As described
by Judge Fess on appeal, the petitioners were a native American Caucasian hus-
band and his naturalized Japanese-born wife. The child, born out of wedlock to
a mother of English descent and a Puerto Rican father, had been surrendered to
a social agency, which had difficulty placing her in a foster home "because of her
mixed nationality background." She was finally placed with the petitioners at
about one year of age, and when (upon their filing of an adoption petition) the
agency was appointed by the court to investigate the suitability of the adoption, it
reported that the child was well and happy, and that her adjustment and devel-
opment in the home were excellent. The agency described the petitioners as
"loving, capable parents" and unqualifiedly recommended allowing the adop-
tion.
Great weight should be accorded this recommendation, said the appellate
court. Judge Fess acknowledged that, under Ohio law, the investigating agency
must take into account "racial, religious, and cultural backgrounds," and that
promotion of the child's welfare must guide the court. But while a child should
48. Id. at 447.
49. Id. at 448. (Emphasis added.)
50. Id.
51. 117 Ohio App. 26, 185 N.E.2d 51 (1962).
52. Larrson 67.
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ordinarily be placed in a family with the same background, any other placement,
he added, "is not precluded."
In considering the best interests of the subject child, it should not
be overlooked that we are dealing here with an unwanted waif whose
father is unknown and whose mother is unable to provide a home with
... love and affection.... Prior to placing the child with the petition-
ers, five other couples seeking children declined to receive the child in
their homes. As we view it, the only alternative ... is to have the
child remain an illegitimate orphan to be reared in an institution.
Orphanages are all well and good but they do not provide a real home
with the attendant care, love and affection incident to the relation of
parent and child.
53
The court remanded the case to the lower court with directions to grant the
petition.54
The last case, and the most directly in point, is Rockefeller v. Nickerson.5
The petitioners, reportedly a "well-to-do white couple of Amityville, Long
Island," had applied to adopt a Negro child, "one of the thirty ... then boarded
by the Nassau Welfare Department at the County Home for the Aged." 50 When
the application was refused by the commissioner of welfare, petitioners sought an
order to compel acceptance. The Supreme Court of Nassau County upheld the
welfare department, holding that the alleged unwritten departmental policy not
to accept white foster parents for Negro children was not e~tablished by the ev-
idence. The petitioners were not considered, said Justice Meyer, for a number of
other reasons-the size of their present family (three natural children, two-one
Korean and one Negro--adopted), their physical capability to have children,
their adoption of another child a few months earlier, the mother's intention to
continue working as a kindergarten teacher. 57 In light of these circumstances,
"the court cannot say that the Department's action ... was arbitrary or unrea-
sonable." The only evidence to the contrary was the "personal views" expressed
by a department official to the petitioners "concerning some of the problems that
might arise from interracial adoption."58 While the court cited In Re Adoption
of a Minor, presumably with approval, by simply upholding the department's
53. Matter of the Adoption of Baker, 117 Ohio App. 26, 28, 185 N.E.2d 51, 53 (1962).
54. Id.
55. 36 Misc. 2d 869, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
56. Larrson 71.
57. But cf. People ex. rel Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 544, 104 N.E.2d 895, 897
(1952) (Desmond, J.), where in a custody case the court said: "Outside employment and the
use of nursery schools by a mother are not things that courts should try to control .... 1
See also Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Adoption Service 37-38 (1959):
"Where a woman who is otherwise suitable as a mother for a particular child plans to con-
tinue to work, consideration should be given to her capacity to provide the mothering and
care that the child needs, and to her ability to make adequate plans for him while she
is at work.
58. Rockefeller v. Nickerson, 36 Misc. 2d 869, 870, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (Sup. Ct.
1962).
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exercise of discretion as reasonable it avoided a holding on the question whether
or not an adoption may be denied solely on a racial basis.5 9
These three decisions, if representative of current judicial practice in this
field (at least on the appellate level), indicate a trend towards the acceptance of
interracial adoption under some circumstances-but it is a very shaky trend. The
Bazelon opinion's declaration that "a difference in race ... alone cannot be de-
cisive in determining the child's welfare" in adoption proceedings is stated
broadly, but it can be narrowed considerably in another factual situation.. That
is, while a court may not "ignore all other relevant considerations," the non-racial
considerations will not necessarily be given "controlling weight," as they were in
the 1955 case. For example, because that case involved adoption by a stepparent,
the court pointed out that the child would remain in the same home whether
adopted or not. This would rarely be the case in the ordinary adoption proceed-
ing. Even where the petitioners are the child's foster parents, there is a very good
chance that the child will be removed from their home sometime in the future.
Further, the child in Minor had not been "placed" in the home in the usual non-
relative adoption manner, but had simply remained with his mother after her
remarriage. A court may be far more reluctant to sanction an interracial situation
which has not come about so naturally.
The Baker decision would be more notable here if one of the parties had
been Negro or part-Negro. Nevertheless, it is significant as a precedent leaning
strongly in favor of interracial (or "intercultural") adoption, at least when the
alternative appears to be institutional care. Its significance is enhanced by the
fact that Ohio's adoption statute is one which requires a consideration of "racial
background."60
The Rockefeller decision, although technically correct, would seem to be the
least satisfactory, for the reason that, in narrowing its examination to the evi-
dence presented in court which bore on departmental policies regarding inter-
racial adoption, the court failed to consider the practical outcome of the case.
Upholding the refusal to accept the petitioners' application to adopt an unwanted
child, boarded by the state in an institution, with small hope for a permanent
placement in a loving home, the court chose to enumerate the alleged flaws in the
petitioners and concluded that the refusal was therefore "not unreasonable."
Clearly, this decision cannot be justified as being in the child's best interests.
Although the court's citation of the Bazelon opiinion suggests that the racial
factor was not "decisive" (and there is no way of knowing whether or not the
couple might have been permitted to adopt a white child), perhaps in this case
it should have been. That is, perhaps the agency and the court should have ex-
amined the child's realistic prospects-as a Negro-for adoption elsewhere, and
then judged the petitioners in light of that sobering outlook. Where a couple are
capable of bearing their own children, for example, it may be justified to deny
59. See the discussion of this case in Alexander, Family Law, 1963 Survey of N.Y. Law,
15 Syracuse L. Rev. 369, 378 (1964).
60. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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them a child for whom many applicants are anxiously competing. But this hardly
seems a realistic approach for a child deemed generally undesirable, who will in
all likelihood be left homeless. Surely a court's reviewing power can be
extended beyond legal niceties to shape a policy more realistic and more respon-
sive to the needs of the child.
(b) Custody
Whether or not the courts will sanction the creation or the continued exis-
tence of an interracial family has perhaps been at issue more often in custody
cases than in cases dealing with adoption.61 Five recent cases reveal the nature of
the problem in this area and their varied treatment by the courts.
In People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser,62 the white mother of a child by her
first husband, also white, had upon divorce married a Negro. The child's maternal
grandmother subsequently petitioned a New York court to take the child from
its mother and grant custody to herself, alleging a number of faults with the
mother's character and care of the child, including the fact that she had married
a man "of a race and religion different from that of the child."0 3 The New York
Court of Appeals did not allow the requested shift in custody, declaring that only
"the gravest reasons" permit a court to transfer a child from its natural parent to
any other person. 64 The Court found "no such proof of neglect as would autho-
rize any court to take an infant from its mother, or interfere in the internal ar-
rangements of family life.... "65 It is probably significant that the child's white
father did not participate in this litigation.
In Murphy v. Murphy,6 a white mother, upon divorce from her white hus-
band, obtained custody of their young son, while the father was given custody of
their daughter. The mother married again, to a Negro, whereupon the father
sued to obtain custody of the son. The trial court approved the change, and on
appeal its decision was affirmed by the Connecticut Supreme Court. The court
balanced one set of considerations (the mother's excommunication from the Cath-
olic Church following her remarriage, her failure to give the boy a religious edu-
cation, and her alienation of her own parents by her remarriage which had de-
prived the boy of their "care and good influence") against those which the child's
placement with his father implied (the care by his paternal grandmother, the
company of his sister, "proper religious training," and visits with his maternal
grandparents), and held that the trial court's conclusion that the child's best
61. This may be because divorce followed by interracial remarriage (and the subse-
quent custody dispute) is more common than interracial adoption, or because, as Greenberg
suggests at 352, adoption decrees are inherently different from custody decrees, which can be
brought into court for modification whenever there is a change in circumstances.
62. 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952) (Desmond, J.).
63. It is reasonable to surmise, with Greenberg, that the underlying ground of the
grandmother's complaint, "though not articulated as such, was that the stepfather was a Ne-
gro." Greenberg 352 n.52.
64. People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1952)
(Desmond, J.).
65. Id. at 544, 104 NE..2d at 898.
66. 143 Conn. 600, 124 A.2d 891 (1956).
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interest would be served by the change in custody was justified. As for the
mother's claim that the decision was "based upon the fact that she had married
a Negro," the court coolly replied that "such a consideration was not included
in those which led the court" to its conclusion. 67
In Fountaine v. Fountaine,6 8 the children involved had been born to a
white mother and a Negro father. Upon their divorce, the father obtained cus-
tody of both children, who thereafter lived with him and his mother, stepfather,
and sisters. When the mother remarried, this time to a white, she set up home
with room for the children in a Chicago neighborhood "in which both white and
colored people live, in which there are many mixed marriages and both colored
and white children attend the same school. '69 With her new husband's consent,
she petitioned for custody. At the hearing, the father claimed that the children
had "the outstanding basic racial characteristics of the Negro race" and that they
would "make a better adjustment to life if allowed to remain identified, reared
and educated with the group and basic stock of ... their father.1 70 Although the
judge found the mother "fit" and her home as suitable for the children as the
father's, he denied the change in custody, commenting that if a difference in color
had not been involved, he would not have hesitated for "a moment in awarding
custody to the mother."
71
On appeal, the mother claimed that the decision, based solely on race, was
an abuse of discretion. The appellate court noted that the trial court had wide
discretion under the statute in determining custody questions; however, it held
that on the record the trial court's conclusion in this case had been reached
"solely because of the racial physical characteristics of the children before him.
." The court condemned such practice, stating,
the question of race alone [cannot] overweigh all other considerations
and be decisive of the question. If this was the sole and decisive consid-
eration,... and it so appears from the record .,. [the trial court's]
discretion was not properly exercised .... 7
The case was therefore remanded to the lower court,73 the standard announced in
In Re Adoption of a Minor having been applied to a custody dispute: race alone
cannot be "decisive."
Potter v. Potter,74 a case resembling Murphy at both the trial and the appel-
67. Id. at 603-04, 124 A.2d at 893.
68. 9 Ill. App. 2d 482, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
69. Id. at 484, 133 N.E.2d 532, 534.
70. Ibid.
71, Id, at 485, 133 N.E.2d at 534.
72. Id. at 486, 133 N.E.2d at 535.
73. "Following the issuance of the Appellate Court mandate, the [father] seized both
of the children and fled with them to Los Angeles, California, where he is, according to
our information, residing with his second wife and both of the children." Letter to the
authors from E. P. Taylor, att'y, Dec. 28, 1960, in J. Goldstein & J. Katz, The Family and
the Law 1074 (1965). This unhappy result cannot fairly be attributed to the appellate court's
treatment of the question of race but, rather, more likely reflects the father's unwillingness
to give up the custody of his children which he had already held for several years.
74. 372 Mich. 637, 127 N.W.2d 320 (1964).
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late level, arose in Detroit, Michigan. Upon the divorce of a white couple, the
mother of their infant daughter was granted custody conditioned upon her re-
maining in Michigan. Shortly thereafter, she left the state with the child and
married a Negro. The natural father later brought the child back to the Midwest
and left her with his parents in Ohio until a Michigan court ordered her placed
temporarily with her maternal grandmother in Detroit. In the custody suit
which followed, the trial court held that the child's best interests would be
served by her remaining in the physical custody of her grandmother, with legal
custody in her father.
In upholding this decision, the Michigan Supreme Court found significant
the mother's leaving the state with her child contrary to the original custody
order; she was, in the court's view, "a young woman who has been in
serious rebellion," lacking "certainty and stability.17 Further, the child had
since her return to the Midwest been in the home of her maternal grandmother,
where she was receiving care and affection. ("That such home is a suitable and
proper one for the upbringing of a young child is not open to question," the court
asserted, ignoring that the same home had produced the child's "rebellious"
young mother.) 76 Finally, the court noted the mother's "attempt . . .to inject
into the case questions of civil rights, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, involving racial equality," and responded: "It is obvious
... that [the trial judge] did not consider such racial differences as significant at
the present time. We fully concur in this view." 77
Dissenting, Judge Smith pointed out as "forgotten" that the child had appar-
ently been "happy, content, and well adjusted with her mother and stepfather
in California before abduction and return by the father .... "Both parents had
exercised self-help "for which contempt could lie." But these considerations
should not be controlling, in any event. "This child should be returned to her
mother" simply because of Michigan's statutory presumption that the mother
should have care and custody of children under twelve where, as here, there is no
showing of physical cruelty, habitual drunkenness, gross neglect, or moral de-
pravity. He noted what life with her mother and stepfather offered the child:
"parental love and cooperation" in "a wholesome community where experiences
in democratic living are promising... , a substantial home sustained by adequate
income ... a full-time mother . . . ," and concluded (in an obvious reference
to the factor of racial difference):
The fears which form the muted thread of this whole proceeding
are patently groundless insofar as the present is concerned. If prob-
lems should develop in the future, corrective measures can be taken at
that time.78
75. Id. at 647, 127 N.W.2d at 326.
76. Id. at 642-44, 127 N.W.2d at 324.
77. Id. at 648, 127 N.W.2d at 326.
78. Id. at 650-54, 127 N.W.2d at 327-29.
ADOPTION AND CUSTODY
In the most recent case, Stingley v. Wesch,79 an Illinois appellate court fol-
lowed the principle of the Fountaine opinion in a situation resembling those in
Murphy and Potter. The white parents of an infant son were divorced in 1964.
The mother obtained custody of the child, and they lived with her parents until
her remarriage in 1965 to a Negro. The child then remained in the home of his
maternal grandparents and occasionally made visits to both parents. When in
1966 the natural father (who lived with his own parents) sought custody of the
child, both parents testified to wanting custody; both were found fit and their
homes suitable, but the court awarded custody to the maternal grandparents, who
had also requested it.80
On appeal, the award was reversed and a hearing ordered to determine cus-
tody between the parents, since, according to the court, where parents seek cus-
tody and are fit to have it, their rights are superior to those of any other person.
The mother's remarriage and relinquishment of the child's physical custody
called for a hearing but were not in themselves sufficient for modification of the
custody decree. And, the court added, Fountaine had held "that in determining
the question of custody as between a Negro father or a Caucasion [sic] mother
the question of the racial characteristics of the children was not decisive. Clearly,
therefore, [the] question of the race of a stepfather would have no significance
in this proceeding." 8'
These cases permit some tentative conclusions about those custody dispo-
sitions where racial differences are involved. It appears that where a mother's
custody is challenged by grandparents only, the courts may allow her to retain
custody even though she has remarried to a Negro. This is clearly the significance
of People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser. Stingley v. Wesch, which also seems to en-
dorse that outcome, implies that where the child's father enters the litigation (as
he did not in Portnoy), the mother's fight for custody may in fact become more
difficult.
Murphy and Potter exemplify the difficulties. They seem to indicate that
where a white mother and father are contestants in a custody suit, the mother's
remarriage to a Negro will lead a court to rely on ordinarily weak arguments
to deny her custody of the child. The court will invariably deny that the
racial factor is decisive, but such claims are questionable in view of the lack of
precedent for some of the arguments which have been used to support these
decisions, e.g., the mother's "instability" where no expert testimony has indi-
cated any serious emotional disturbance; the child's deprivation of the atten-
tions of his "alienated" grandparents.
Fountaine is almost unique among the reported cases in that there the
white mother, remarried to another white, sought to regain custody from her
Negro first husband of their mixed children. Its declaration, however, that
79. 77 Il. App. 2d 472, 222 N.E.2d 505 (1966).
80. Id. at 474, 222 N.E.2d at 506.
81. Id. at 476-77, 222 N.E2d at 507.
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race alone cannot be decisive in custody matters, seems to have set a useful
precedent for subsequent custody cases of the more conventional sort, such
as Stingley v. Wesch.
82
(2) Agency Practice
The practices followed by social agencies in the field of adoption are influ-
enced, either directly or indirectly, by the particular adoption laws under which
they operate. Apparently considerable dissatisfaction exists among agencies with
much of current adoption law, both written and enforced. More than three-
fourths of the agencies queried in a comprehensive survey of public and private
agencies conducted by the Child Welfare League of America in 1954 "indicated
that present laws should be revised in one way or another," in many instances
because agency thinking is "ahead" of the law.83
The work of the agencies is reportedly "frustrated" by law in a number of
ways.8 4 One source of frustration, for at least some agencies, may be statutory
or judicially-imposed restrictions upon interracial placements. As already noted, 85
some states? statutes limit agency freedom to place children with adoptive parents
of another race. In other states, the judges handling adoption petitions may
choose to limit placements similarly, whether or not statute directs or even sug-
gests that they do.86 But even if statutes were silent and judicial neutrality
could be assumed, the factor of race would still not be totally ignored in the
adoption process because agencies themselves do not wholly ignore it. Indeed,
the traditional agency concern with "matching" parents and children often plays
a predominant role in discouraging interracial adoptions from taking place with
any frequency.
The "matching" process generally involves a consideration by the agency
of "[plhysical, mental, psychological, and religious factors," in an effort to keep
the adopted child from differing "too much" from his parents.87 Whether or not
"matching" is important in good adoption practice "has been the subject of con-
tinuing controversy ... , but there is little doubt that it is a part of the process in
most agencies."88
Schapiro has reported that most agencies participating in the 1954 survey
accepted the principle that similarities in background were more likely to facili-
tate integration of a child into a family. But, at the same time, there was "no
unanimity of opinion on what constitutes sound matching and on whether like-
82. But cf. Ward v. Ward, 36 Wash. 2d 143, 216 P.2d 755 (1950). In that case, a
white mother was found to be unfit to have custody of her children and it was awarded to
their Negro father, the court adding (as "another reason") that the "colored" children of
the marriage "will have a much better opportunity to take their rightful place in society
if they are brought up among their own people," Id. at 145, 216 P.2d at 756.
83. 1 Schapiro 12, 90-93.
84, Id. at 93-107.
85. See supra sec. A pp. 306-09.
86. See supra sec. B(1) pp. 309-14.
87. Comment, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 99
Yale L.J. 715, 722 (1950).
88. Foote, Levy & Sander 502.
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ness should be considered at all in placing children for adoption." While the tradi-
tional rationale is that
a child wants to be like his parents, that parents can more easily iden-
tify with a child who resembles them, and that the fact of adoption
should not be accentuated by placing a child with parents who are
different from him,
Schapiro found "wide variance" in this area of agency practice. Some agencies
feared "even considering" that there may be people who can accept such differ-
ences, or that others can "further develop" their capacity for such acceptance.
Nevertheless, according to Schapiro, there is increasing evidence that "match-
ing-in physical appearance, nationality and racial background, and intellectual
potential-does not have the weight often given it .... ,,89
An anthropologist who evaluated the concept of nationality and racial
matching at the National Conference on Adoption in January, 1955, pointed to
the fundamental distinction between genetic and acquired attributes. "Cultural
attributes," the characteristics acquired during one's lifetime, are not inherent;
and therefore, "no more difficulty would be encountered in a young child learn-
ing or acquiring the cultural attributes of the adoptive parents than would a
natural child learning from his own parents." Further, while true racial charac-
teristics are genetic in origin, to some extent "the problems of race are those
created by the social environment in which we live." For example, specific per-
sonality and psychological characteristics are attributed to certain races. "As a
consequence, some concern is frequently felt that conflicts on this score might
also arise between adoptive parents and child when they are of different racial
origins." But while intelligence scores do reveal differences between whites and
Negroes on standardized IQ tests, such differences between races subjected to
divergent influences, e.g., in education, can be discounted as largely "non-genetic
and non-racial." In any event, they are relatively small when compared to the
range within any race: high and low IQ scores are found in all racial groups. As
for personality types, "as far as we can judge, [these] similarly are not restricted
to any one race."' 0 The import of these remarks would appear to be that racial
matching has little significance at least in terms of reducing such "disturbing
elements in the parent-child relationship" as personality incompatibility and con-
flicts due to intellectual disparities.
The traditional position is still, however, determinedly argued:
Certainly a black-haired, black-eyed child of south Italian ancestry
might be exposed to considerable emotional stress if he were adopted
by a Scandinavian couple ... partly due to the striking physical con-
trast between him and his foster parents ...
89. 1 Schapiro 84.
90. H. Shapiro, Anthropology and Adoption Practice, in 2 Schapiro 34-38.
91. R. Cook, Genetics and Adoption Practices, in 2 Schapiro 64. Cook's hypothetical
adoption is, in reverse, strikingly like the Liuni case, New York's adoption cause cflabre of
1966. The Ulster County Welfare Commissioner ruled that the "coloring and ethnic back-
ground" of the American-bor Liunis, "brunets of Italian descent," made them "unsuitable
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Where inter-nationality adoption is assumed to create "emotional stress," inter-
racial adoption would presumably have disastrous consequences.
While the value of "matching" as an abstract principle can be debated in-
definitely, adherence to it in agency practice can be measured with somewhat
more objectivity. The 1954 survey inquired into the matching factors considered
important by adoption agencies. Responding agencies emphasized four factors:
level of intelligence and intellectual potential, religious background, racial back-
ground, .and tempermental needs. Of the 250 agencies, 240 considered racial
background important, and Schapiro commented that even though the ten other
agencies "reported they did not consider racial background important, we know
from practice that agencies are not placing Negro children in white homes or
white children in Negro homes." Some agencies placed children of "mixed racial
background" in homes where the background of the parents was different, but in
most of those cases the children were of Oriental-white or Indian-white, rather
than Negro-white, background.9 2
The 1954 survey data can no longer be considered completely representative
of adoption agency attitudes towards racial matching. During the 1950's, a few
agencies began to place Negro and part-Negro children in white homes, and al-
though it has been noted that "the majority of adoption workers have not devel-
oped the capacity or courage to operate in this controversial area", the trend
seems to be gaining increasing acceptanceY3 In an attempt to measure this trend,
a brief questionnaire was devised and sent in February, 1967, to ninety-one agen-
cies selected in a random fashion from a recent listing of social agencies engaged
in adoption services in the United States. 94 Forty of the total were public agen-
cies, including all thirty-eight state-wide bureaus, plus two metropolitan-county
agencies. The fifty-one private agencies included at least one agency in nearly
every state and encompassed non-sectarian, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish
agencies, as well as one exclusively Negro institution in the South.
The response rate was high: twenty-eight public (61 percent of the total
queried) and thirty-four private (66 percent) agencies returned the question-
naire. The majority of both the public and private agencies which failed to re-
spond were located in the Southern states. Four private respondents indicated
that they no longer handled adoption activities. The public agencies were pre-
sumably not restricted to any particular racial or religious groups among those
in their states. Of the thirty private-agency respondents, five primarily placed
adoptive parents" for a blond, blue-eyed, 42-year-old child who had been placed with them
as a foster child five days after birth. "What's this ethnic background business," Mrs. Liuni
asked. "We're all Americans, aren't we?" N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1966, at 1, col. 4. The adop-
tion was subsequently approved by the county court. Time, Jan 27, 1967, at 76.
92. 1 Schapiro 84-86.
93. See Shepard, Adopting Negro Children: White Families Find It Can Be Done, New
Republic, June 20, 1964, at 10; E. Branham, Transracial Adoptions passin (mimeographed
paper by staff member, Los Angeles County Dep't of Adoptions, undated); Letter from
Charles B. Olds, supra note 23.
94. C. & H. Doss, If You Adopt a Child 219-341 (1957).
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Protestant children; five, Catholic; and two, Jewish; eighteen did not primarily
place children of any particular group.
The agencies were asked first about the number of Negro children they
handled in a year. Nearly two-thirds reported handling from 1 to 25. One third
of the public agencies indicated that they serviced more than 50 (no private
agency did); four private agencies handled none (no public agency did). The
distribution of the Southern agencies favored the lower end of the scale (TABLE
I).
TABLE I
NuzERa or NEGRO CHiDREN SERviCED ANmuALLY
Total More
Responding None 1-25 25-50 than 50
Public 27 0 15 (56%) 3 (11%) 9 (33%)
Private 30 4 (13%) 21 (70%) 5 (17%) 0
Total 57 4 ( 7%) 36 (63%) 8 (14%) 9 (16%)
The agencies were then asked: "Has your agency ever placed, or does it place"
Negro children in white or mixed homes? An overwhelming majority reported
that they had (several indicated "mixed only"; this may have been true for
most), but the proportion among the public agencies was considerably higher
(TABLE II). Percentages or figures, where supplied, were very low.
TABLE II
PLACEMENT or NEGRO CLDRE 3N WH itE OR MED Ho MEs
Total
Responding Yes No
Public 28 23 (82%) 5 (18%)
Private 30 18 (60%) 12 (40%)
Total 58 41 (72%) 17 (28%)
Were white children ever placed in Negro or mixed homes? A relatively
small number of both public and private agencies reported such placements,
although the incidence among public agencies was somewhat higher. Many com-
mented that the need to find other than white homes for white children was mini-
mal, but some said they would consider making such placements where the need
arose. The Southern agencies uniformly answered "no" (TABLE III).
TABLE III
PLACrEMT op WTE Cxmmxpmq n NEGRO OR MIXED HOMES
Total
Responding Yes No
Public 28 4 (13%) 24 (87%)
Private 30 1 ( 3%) 29 (97%)
Total 58 , (9%) 53 (91%)
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Were mixed children ever placed in white or Negro homes? About nine out
of ten agencies answered "yes" to this query, public agencies somewhat more
often than private. Private Southern agencies were the most hostile to the idea.
(TABLE IV). Percentages and figures here, while still low, were higher than
those for Negro placements in white or mixed homes.
TABLE IV
PLACEMENT OF MixD CninDREN iN WHITE OR NEGRO HomEs
Total
Responding Yes* No
Public 28 26 (93%) 2 (7%)
Private 30 25 (83%) 5 (17%)
Total 58 51 (88%) 7 (12%)
* (3 of these indicated "Negro only"; 2 indicated "white only")
Whether or not the agency made such placements, its views of interracial
adoption were solicited. About one third of the total were "strongly in favor" of
it (none of these was a Southern agency). Another third found it "inappropriate
to generalize," while the remainder was largely "neither in favor nor opposed"
or "somewhat in favor" of the idea. Two Southern agencies were the only re-
spondents either "somewhat" or "strongly opposed." Public agencies were far
more "strongly in favor" than private agencies: it was the former's most popu-
lar choice. (Table V).
TABLE V
AGENCY ViEws OF INTERRACIAL ADOPTION
Total
Responding Public Private Total
(in Parentheses) (27) (29) (56)
Strongly in Favor 12 (44%) 7 (24%) 19 (34%)
Somewhat in Favor 3 (11%) 2 ( 7%) 5 ( 9%)
Neither in favor nor Opposed 1 ( 4%) 9 (310) 10 (18%)
Somewhat Opposed 1( 4%) 0 1 ( 2%)
Strongly Opposed 1 ( 4%) 0 1 ( 2%)
Inappropriate to Generalize 9 (33%) 11 (38%) 20 (36%)
Last, the agencies were asked, "What should be the law's position in this
area?" No respondent agency believed that the law should prohibit all interracial
adoption, choice (a), and only one chose (b), the somewhat vague "Allow inter-
racial adoption but only where it is unavoidably necessary." The majority (two-
thirds) split almost evenly between allowing interracial adoption "in all cases
where it is desired by the otherwise-qualified parents" (d), and allowing it under
those circumstances when there is, additionally, "a showing that the child will
be accepted in the parents' community" (c). The remaining one-third was evenly
divided between (e), encouraging interracial adoption, "perhaps even modifying
standards for adoptive parents where they are willing to adopt Negro or other
322
ADOPTION AND CUSTODY
minority-group children," and (g), where "other" comments could be written in.
Predictably, no agency chose (f), which would "require prospective adoptive
parents either to take a child of another race under certain circumstances, or take
no child at all." Private agencies showed a more "liberal" streak here than else-
where, favoring (d) and (e) to a greater degree than did their public counterparts
(TABLE VI).
TABLE VI
PosmoN oF LAW PREFERRED BY AGENCIES
(Total
Responding) Public Private Total
Choice (28) (29) (57)
(a) 0 0 0
(b) 1(4%) 0 1(2%)
(c) 10 (36%) 9 (31%) 19 (33%)
(d) 9 (32%) 11 (38%) 20 (35%)
(e) 3 (11%) 5 (17%) 8 (14%)
(f) 0 0 0
(g) 5 (18%) 4 (14%) 9 (16%)
It is interesting to trace the views most favorable to interracial adoption-
those "strongly in favor" in TABLE V and those "encouraging" it in TABLE
VI-to the agencies who chose them. Among the public agencies, these responses
were made by agencies in three Eastern urban areas and by a number of agencies
in the Western part of the United States. Midwestern and Southern agencies are
notably absent from this group. Among private agencies, the most favorable
position was taken by four agencies in fair-sized cities in the Midwest; the others
were agencies in New York City, Portland, Oregon, and Bangor, Maine. None of
the Catholic agencies asserted a strongly favorable position; one Protestant and
one Jewish agency were, however, included in this group.
The comments made by many agencies proved to be illuminating. First, a
number indicated that they faced legal barriers to interracial placements. The
Louisiana state agency's spokesman referred to its statute prohibiting interracial
adoption and commented: "I do not think this state is ready for a change in the
law." A Georgia agency similarly referred to the requirement in that state that
race be considered by the investigating agency in determining the adoption's
suitability: according to this agency, the report to the state department's "spe-
cifically asks" if the child's race is similar to the adoptive parents. The same
agency also noted the relevance of the state's miscegenation statute (then valid):
Our laws prohibit interracial marriage. A child reared in a home with
parents of a different race will be apt to meet and want to marry a per-
son of his or her parents' background, not his own.
In Missouri, where miscegenation was also prohibited, the courts were indicted
as "not honoring" such placements; in an Indiana city, an agency reported, the
judge "who has final authority ... refiuses to legalize such adoptions." And in
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Florida, a private agency indicated that it faced opposition, if not from the law,
from its governing board:
We would place more such children if our Board were in agreement.
Being Southern, it refuses to realistically face these areas of concern.
Several agencies expressed concern with pressures, tradition, and generally con-
servative sentiments in their communities, or with the complications that might
accompany the child's adolescence:
Interracial adoption presents "more than ordinary risks and difficulties,
so long as there remains so much prejudice."
Acceptance by the community is "highly important."
The adoptive couple must consider "ramifications, friends, relatives,
church, neighbors, own children, community."
We are strongly opposed because of "tradition, community unable to
accept such placements generally, fear of repercussions."
The placement of a colored child in a white home would lead to many
complications," especially "when he reaches adolescence [sic]."
Other agencies noted that they were engaged in large-scale efforts to place Indian
and other non-Negro minority-group children, and that in general it was easier
to find homes for them than for Negro children. Many emphasized the "indi-
vidual needs" of each child and indicated that they were guided in every case
by that consideration and no others:
We try not to let race enter into the decision whenever possible ...
The best available home should be selected for a child. Color is only
one factor.
Finally, a significant number of agencies expressed sentiments favorable to inter-
racial adoption:
Placement of Negro child in white home should be encouraged where
parents.., are found to be well-motivated.... This may well be the
child's only opportunity for a permanent home.
Our experience in trans-racial adoptions has been a positive one....
We do not believe in using a child as a tool to solve a social injustice.
We are strongly in favor of good interracial adoptions because we have
seen them work to the great benefit of the children involved.
Living with a loving family, emotional and personality compatibility
is more important to both child and family than the matching of physi-
cal characteristics, including race.
The law should allow interracial adoption without reservations. Agen-
cies should encourage [it] ....
Although this questionnaire contained many inadequacies, to a large extent
it served its purpose of bringing to light the current practices of a large number of
public and private adoption agencies. The results seem to show that (1) there is
ADOPTION AND CUSTODY
increased acceptance of the principle of interracial adoption in recent years, and
(2) a considerable number of interracial placements-relatively speaking-have
actually been made. While many agencies still express reluctance to move into
this area and fear unhappy consequences for those who do, a sizable number of
their colleagues lean strongly in favor of this once-heretical idea. As one agency
of the latter persuasion phrased it, "Parenthood means rearing a child-not
matching races."
III. THE ROLE oF Socmm An PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSMERATIONS
The social and psychological considerations which underlie those adoption
and custody decisions where racial differences are involved deserve careful exani-
nation. The critical question here must be: Do these considerations ever justify
making the difference in race either a significant element or a controlling one in
the process of decision?
In the area of custody, the question has generally been raised by white rela-
tives who protest the existence of a white child in a home with a Negro stepfather.
In the adoption area, the question is largely one of the placement of Negro or
part-Negro children in white homes.95 Thus the two areas of inquiry present two
rather different situations. In one, a white child may be growing up in an inter-
racial home with his own mother but with a Negro as his "father" for most daily
purposes. In the other, a Negro child grows up in a home with white parents and
white (or nonwhite, or both) siblings.98 Both of these settings must be sanctioned
by the courts-in custody cases, where the mother's custody is challenged after
her remarriage; in adoption cases, where the first hurdle of placement has been
met. One writer has called both kinds of cases "delicate and explosive," noting
wide adherence to the theory that it is harmful to expose children to parent-
figures of a different race.97 What precisely are the competing considerations?
95. The scope of this paper does not permit consideration of the question of adoption
of white children by Negro couples, but, in any event, it is something of an academic
question. The placement of white children does not present the social problem that the
placement of Negro children does, since there are apparently a sufficient number of white
homes for the white children needing them (with the possible exception of handicapped or
other children with special needs). Nevertheless, it would seem reasonable, at least in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, to place white children in Negro homes where, all
other factors, e.g., income, considered, such a placement was in the child's best interest.
While some might protest that a white child in a Negro home will be identified as a Negro
and will therefore lose his "social status" as a white man (see text accompanying note 48
supra) that alone, where assumed to be valid, does not render such a placement adverse to the
child's total interest. Further, it is possible that a white child in a Negro community would be
subjected to fewer difficulties than the Negro child in a white one. Bernard suggests that
Negroes tend to be more tolerant of racial intermarriage, than whites. J. Bernard, Marriage
and Family Among Negroes 88 (1966). Such tolerance would presumably carry over to an
adopted child.
96. Of course, other mixtures than this are possible, but they are not considered here
because they do not present the question so starkly. Thus, it will be assumed that any
arguments made for the adoption of a Negro child by a white couple are that much




The custody disputes in this area have generally involved the weighing of
two conflicting interests: first, the usual presumption (in many states, embodied
in statute) in favor of custody in the mother, at least where the children are
young and especially where they are girls, in the absence of a demonstrable lack
of fitness; and second, the reluctance on the part of many judges to allow a
white child to grow up in a home with a Negro stepfather. Where the question
arises, is there any social or psychological basis for denying the usual presump-
tion, where it would otherwise determine the outcome, solely because of the
stepfather's race?
Although the father in the Potter custody case alleged that his white daugh-
ter would be "rejected, shunned and avoided by children of both races, and as a
result her entire life could.. .be adversely affected," the trial judge concluded
that there is "no legal authority that living in an interracial home which is other-
wise favorable is injurious to a minor child." Asserting that his decision against
custody in the mother was based on other grounds, he noted:
We have been exhibited no authoritative studies in the behavioral sci-
ences that indicate hurt or injury to a child in an interracial home
which is happy and stable.98
Psychologist Kenneth Clark has concurred, saying that child reared in an
interracial home would not be damaged emotionally "just by the fact of his being
in an interracial home." The problem, "if there is a problem, is related to spe-
cific qualities in the parents. And each case must be judged on its own merits," 9
On the other hand, if custody in the mother is denied, the alternative fre-
quently is physical custody in a grandmother or grandparents who often display
hostility towards the mother. This would appear to be potentially far more dam-
aging to the child than the injury claimed to result from a home's interracial
make-up.100
Another advantage to the child of remaining with his mother is that he may
be raised in an integrated community. A Detroit psychiatrist called as a witness
at the Potter hearing weighed the relative merits of Riverside, California, the
integrated community where the mother and stepfather lived, and Detroit, where
the white father and grandmother lived, and found Riverside a more favorable
setting for a child. Although he did not consider the neighborhood "as crucial in
a pre-school child's psychological development as the immediate home situation,"
he viewed the multi-racial Riverside community as "better for the child than
the Detroit neighborhood which is fraught with anxiety about property values
and unresolved conflicts about race."1 0'
Thus, while not much is actually known about the problems a white child
98. Id. at 70-71.
99. Quoted in id. at 74.
100. See testimony of child psychiatrist at Potter trial as described in id. at 70.
101. Id.
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in this position might face, there seems to be little support for denying custody
to a mother in a dispute of this nature. Unless the mother is found to be unfit for
one of the reasons generally recognized by the law, e.g., gross neglect or habitual
drunkenness, the normal presumption in her favor should apply. This is espe-
cially true where the alternative is placement with grandparents, since parental
rights should generally prevail against those of any other party.10 2 But even
where the father (a parent, too) has remarried and can provide the child with a
stepmother and a satisfactory home life, he should perhaps be required to prove
the mother's general lack of fitness or some adverse effect on the child's develop-
ment by virtue of his being in an interracial home, in order to obtain a shift in
custody. There is no need to upset the continuity in the child's home-life pattern
unless something detrimental in his situation can be shown. Merely assuming
that a Negro stepfather-regardless of his personal qualities, his educational and
income level, and his feelings towards the child-is a liability to a white child to
be avoided at all costs, is clearly an assumption no court is qualified to make.
Adoption
The focus in this area is upon the Negro child and the consequences of his
placement in a white home. In deciding whether or not such a placement is appro-
priate, social agencies and the courts must begin by examining the various alter-
natives available to the child.
(a) First, the child may remain with his mother. (Of course, the mother
must want to relinquish her child before any other alternatives can be consid-
ered.) If he is an illegitimate child, he will probably have a less than optimal
upbringing, though this is far from certain. Some studies have shown that unwed
mothers who keep their illegitimate children tend to have unfavorable personality
characteristics and often appear to be unsatisfactory mothers, but where they
are Negro, this is not so clearly the case.' 03 This difference, if it exists, may reflect
the finding that unwed motherhood (while far from being totally accepted) does
not have the stigma attached to it in the Negro community that it does in the
white community, 0 4 as well as the fact that adoptive homes for Negro children
are in relatively short supply, and therefore, more Negro mothers who keep their
children may do so out of necessity than because of some neurotic need. °5
The unwanted Negro child will probably be brought up in a home without
a father. A host of factors tend to discourage Negro men, far more than white
102. See People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952), and
Stingley v. Wesch, 77 Ill. App. 2d 472, 222 N.E.2d 505 (1966). But cf. Painter v. Bannister,
140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
The simple statement made in the text belies the many complexities which may arise
in a custody dispute. While only a minority of jurisdictions adhere to the "parental right"
theory, many other jurisdictions apply the free-wheeling "welfare of the child" standard
along with a presumption in favor of the parents. For a description of the problems in this
area, see Comment, Alternatives to (Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving
Third Parties, 73 Yale LJ. 151 (1963).
103. See Foote, Levy & Sander 144-45.
104. J. Bernard, supra note 95, at 50-55.
105. See supra sec. I pp. 303-06.
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men, from remaining in a family unit and from taking a great interest in father-
hood.106 Thus the mother's prospects for a stable marriage or for any other
means of providing a stable father-figure for her child are relatively poor. Petti-
grew has noted recent psychological research exploring the personality effects
upon children of being raised without a father. According to one study, children
whose fathers are absent seek "immediate gratification" far more than children
whose fathers are present in the home. This trait has "serious implications," since
children who manifest it have also shown decreased "social responsibility" and
orientation toward achievement and are more prone toward delinquency. Two
psychologists have in fact concluded that "the inability to delay gratification is
a critical factor in immature, criminal, and neurotic behavior."'1 7 Another per-
sonality effect may be "unusual difficulty in differentiating between male and
female roles," an effect traced in boys as they grow older to an exaggerated mas-
culinity and a "strongly-felt need for power." Present data thus suggest at least
some link between the father's absence and the child's proclivity towards juvenile
delinquency, crimes against persons, and schizophrenia. 0 8
Where the child remains with his mother, another problem may arise out of
the "kinship assistance" common among lower-income groups. Bernard reports
that most nonwhite children live in large, often multigenerational families; and,
an illegitimate child probably stands a better chance than others of growing up
in such a household. The result may be severely crowded conditions. The child
finds himself "competing with a number of siblings and relatives for care and
desired responses;" and, at the lowest income levels, he competes "for sheer
survival." Other adverse results have been traced to crowded living conditions,
among them sexual maladjustment and a lack of self-sufficiency. 109
(b) If the mother is unwilling or unable to keep her child, one alternative
for the child is an institution; another is foster-home care. Both foster-home care
and institutional care are less than ideal for child development, and both have re-
ceived harsh criticism in recent years. Foster care is currently favored because,
in theory, it provides a "family" setting for a child. However, many children in
foster care spend their childhood "moving through a series of families without
continuing close ties to any adult." Where a child is not unadoptable because of
unsevered ties to his parent or parents, these two alternatives should generally be
106. T. Pettigrew, A Profile of the Negro American 16-17 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Pettigrew]. Even legitimate Negro children suffer much more from "father-absence" than
do whites.
107. Id. at 17.
108. Id. at 17-22. That still another form of anti-social behavior may result from this
situation has been noted in a study of the riots which took place in Detroit, Michigan,
during the summer of 1967. Dr. Elliot Luby, a psychiatrist, found that among persons
arrested in the rioting "the most impressive statistic is the dramatically small number of
arrestees who have lived in a home with a father. Less than half enjoyed the kind of parental
support .. .which only a father can provide. Even more devastating was the fact that
over one-fourth lost their father before the age of 2 . . . ." Kondracke, Detroit Negroes Still
Hoping For Reform, Chicago Sun-Times, Oct. 21, 1967, at 26, col. 1.
109. J. Bernard, supra note 95, at 130-32.
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viewed as a poor second-best to adoption. 110 For as one social scientist has writ-
ten, "... it is a very serious thing to condemn a child to be parked in an endless
succession of foster-homes or to be brought up in an institution when there are
long waiting lists of suitable parents wishing to adopt children. .. .""I
(c) The final alternative for the child is adoption. Tradition points to a
Negro home for a Negro child. But even if tradition is indulged "when practi-
cable" (to use the standard applied under "religious protection" statutes1 2 ),
there are currently not enough Negro homes available for all Negro children who
might be adopted. There is, however, another possibility: placements of Negro
children in white homes.
The problems created by such placements must be conceded. First, because
of persistent housing patterns in American cities, most neighborhoods have either
predominantly white or predominantly Negro populations.113 As a corollary, the
public schools in those neighborhoods, at least where busing or other schemes to
correct "racial imbalance" are not yet employed, are similarly segregated. This
means that many prospective white adoptive parents would welcome Negro chil-
dren into communities where the child not merely was one of a distinct minority
but might actually be the single nonwhite member. Would this be in the child's
"best interest"?
Where the alternatives are a neglected, unwanted existence in an econom-
ically hard-pressed environment, or an institutional or foster-parent upbringing,
a strong argument can be made that it is, indeed, in the child's "best interest."
This argument must first, however, deal with two nagging questions. The first
involves the notion that the members of an interracial family face "intolerable
community pressures," i.e., children and parents in an interracial home inevitably
suffer from harassment and other forms of pressure from neighbors and others
in the community. That such harassment has occurred is established fact." 4
However, it is hardly inevitable." 5 Even if some sort of pressure is assumed, it is
reasonable to assume further that it exists to varying degrees in different com-
munities. Moreover, there appear to be a number of families with the strength
and independence to withstand these pressures, where they do exist.
If it is supposed, then, that the white family which adopts a Negro child is
prepared to cope with pressures from the community, and does indeed cope with
110. See Foote, Levy & Sander 143 n.158, 460-64.
111. H. Bowlby, Maternal Care and Mental Health (1952), in id. at 150-53.
112. See infra sec. IV(A) (1).
113. K. Taeuber & A. Taeuber, Negroes in Cities 2-8 (1965).
114. E.g., N.Y. Times, March 24, 1966, at 28: "A minister and his wife, both white,
will give up a 2-year-old Negro boy they adopted a year ago because they have been
'harassed, humiliated and threatened' by persistent telephone callers." Many calls threatened
the couple's four other children, according to the Rev. Albert Cohen of Fullerton, California.
"We have to give up," he said. "We thought we could stand up and be counted but we
just don't have the personal strength."
115. See Shepard, suPra note 93, at 12, asserting that the parents involved in inter-
racial adoptions in Minnesota reported no "racial crises." "Perhaps the neighbors who dis-
approve keep their opinions to themselves." Parents "have a hard time recalling any un-
pleasant incidents?
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them satisfactorily, the question remains: What is the impact of such an adoption
on the child? It might be argued that the child will be the victim of rejection
and discrimination at the hands of neighboring white children. But, at least
during childhood, the Negro child is unlikely to receive any more discriminatory
treatment from his peers than the redheaded child who is covered with an inordi-
nate number of freckles or the child who must wear glasses at an early age. Chil-
dren are aware of physical differences and will comment on them, but they attach
little significance to those differences unless adults do it for them.110 Here, of
course, is where the real difficulty lies. Adults often attach prejudices to color
differences, and these are frequently communicated to their children, But perhaps
it is not overly optimistic to predict that where a Negro child is brought into a
white community, the children's exposure to each other will go far to minimize
the weight white youngsters give to their parents' prejudices.
Adolescence presents more significant problems. There is great anxiety on
the part of many white parents over the results of interracial friendships as their
children grow older and begin to date and marry. (One writer has referred to this
as the "puberty argument." 1t 17 ) This anxiety has in fact been found to create ten-
sions between Negro and white teenagers. According to a 1955 study of a volun-
tary-organization group made up of 22 Negro and 17 white adolescents of both
sexes, all from stable middle-class homes in a Northern city, interracial opposite-
sex friendships were found to create emotional conflict among the white members.
This conflict was traced largely to parental disapproval, although rejection by
age-peer acquaintances and strangers' reactions to interracial gatherings were
also indicated as disturbing influences. The researcher concluded that this finding
revealed a problem which "cannot be ruled out as a possible major source of ten-
sion in many types of interracial settings." If the whites' conflict is communicated
to the Negroes in the group, he added, it is "a likely source of Negro insecurity in
social relations with whites."' 8s It can be argued that these tensions are lessening
as interracial settings become more common and win greater acceptance among
the younger members of our society, if not among their parents. However, it is
unrealistic to say that parental disapproval of interracial dating has diminished
to the point where it fails to influence a large number of young people, and it
will undoubtedly continue to influence them for some time to come. One social
worker has maintained that this problem need not "completely devastate" a Ne-
gro youngster,"1 9 but it surely remains as one of the largest emotional hurdles he
will face.
The second nagging question in this area: Will the Negro child have signifi-
cant "identity" problems if he is raised in a white community? Indeed he may.120
116. See 0. Ritchie & M. Koller, Sociology of Childhood 247 (1964).
117. Larrson 72-73.
118. 1. Katz, Conflict and Harmony in an Adolescent Interracial Group passim (195).
119. H. Fricke, Project Coordinator, Parents to Adopt Minority Youngsters, qiwted in
Shepard, supra note 93, at 12.
120. Compared with the problems he might face in developing his "self-identity"
within the Negro community, these problems shrink in significance; he may actually come
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Thirty-five years ago, the child of a mixed Negro~white marriage was said to have
"psychological problems" because he belonged to neither the white nor Negro
community. Idealizing the "culturally dominant" white group, seeking "recog-
nition from and admission to it," he was nevertheless "branded socially by his
Negroid characteristics."
He is, in consequence, a man of divided loyalties.... The mixed blood's
hysterical and insistent knocking at the white man's door is a familiar
sound in every bi-racial situation.12 '
Despite the value-laden language, it is likely that there is some truth in this anal-
ysis. One can at least say that a Negro child raised in a white community, like
some mixed children perhaps, may want to identify with one group and wil be
confronted with two largely disparate groups between which he must choose.
There is, therefore, some merit in leaving the Negro child in his own community.
Along these lines, some have postulated the significance of "socialization as a
Negro" for the Negro child, who must (according to this theory) learn how to
assume "the Negro role," e.g., by developing protection against a hostile environ-
ment.1 22 This has questionable validity today, in view of recent thinking which
stresses instead the need for Negroes to learn "the role of the equal citizen."'-
Still, this has been called "a time to be black."'124 Trends in recent years suggest
"heightened group identification" among Negroes; and, as Rose has predicted,
"group identification may become so strong that Negroes ... may not want full
integration."'1- 5 Perhaps it is presumptuous, especially in the light of increasing
racial consciousness on the part of many Negroes, for the white community to
assume that any child brought into one of its homes is going to reap enormous
advantages at the risk of losing little. The "new Negro" may even be unnerved
at the thought of Negro children being raised by white parents, possibly in a
predominantly white community. As James Baldwin has pointedly asked: "Do I
really want to be integrated into a burning house?"' 2 6
Assuming that these problems do exist and confront the white family and the
Negro child it wishes to include within its home: Are they sufficient to dismiss
the prospect of interracial homes? Do they, in particular, provide law-makers
with a valid justification for making the existence of such homes illegal, or even
merely suspect? It is submitted that they do not.
The most significant element in a child's development, according to most
authorities, is the environment in which he spends his early years: "the earliest
out ahead. There are indications, however, that this identity problem within the Negro
community is undergoing drastic change.
121. S. Reuter, Racial Mixture 214-16 (1931).
122. See J. Bernard's treatment of the analysis by E. Frazier in J. Bernard, supra note
95, at 144-49,
123. See Pettigrew 161-68.
124. Detwiler, A Time to Be Black, New Republic, Sept. 17, 1966, at 19.
125. A. Rose in Postcript Twenty Years Later at xxxi-xxxii in G. Myrdal, supra note 1.
126. 3. Baldwin, The Fire Next Time 108 (1964).
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experiences of an individual form the basis for all that develops in later life." 127
The role of the family in this process is, of course, pervasive.
Family life and satisfactory relationships between parents and
child create the natural setting in which wholesome personality develop-
ment of children takes place. To attain his maximum potentiality, every
child must have the security and affection of a family. .. .A child
needs a close and continuing relationship with a mother and father who
love him and whom he can love .... 12
8
Thus, the home life experienced by a child is critical in determining his ego-
strength and his ability to cope with the pressures he will face as an adult. Where
a child, therefore, will otherwise have an unsatisfactory developmental environ-
ment, placement in a home where he will receive love and acceptance would seem
to override almost any objection raised because of mere racial differences. Indeed,
the significance of a "warm, supportive home" may be even greater for a Negro
child than for a white. According to Pettigrew, considerable research has indi-
cated that young Negro children tend to experience identity problems in their
own community because of the "unique and socially-defined inferior" status of
Negro Americans which they encounter at an early age. Many Negro children de-
velop symptoms of "self-hate" and problems of self-esteem because they accept,
consciously or unconsciously, assertions of their inferiority. Further, for much
the same reasons, they may develop a tendency to view the world "as a hostile,
threatening place."'129 While the thinking which produces these results has been
undergoing a process of change, its effects will most likely be felt for some years
ahead. It would seem that being raised in a home-white or black-where there
is affection and acceptance of himself as a valuable member of the family might
help the Negro child to develop a stronger ego and to deal more successfully with
the pressures which will face him. As Pettigrew notes, social scientists have come
to emphasize "the stability and structure of the home as crucial factors in counter-
acting the effects of racism upon Negro personality." The type of home life a
Negro enjoys as a child assumes special significance when he becomes aware of
the "social devaluation" of being a Negro, usually at adolescence: just how he
"bears up" under this severe emotional stress is largely a function of the degree
of ego-strength that he has developed in his earlier, family-centered years.
The ego-strong Negro, nurtured in a stable and complete family ...
maintains his self-respect as a unique and worthwhile human being
apart from the position of inferior being that the racists insist he as-
sume. 13
0
For similar reasons, adoption by older couples (a practice generally frowned
upon) has been endorsed by one student of Negro adoptions:
The harsh reality remains that as long as there is a dearth of adoptive
homes for Negro youngsters, the placement of a child with an older
127. 0. Ritchie & M. Koller, supra note 110, at 3.
128. Child Welfare League of America, Standards for Adoption Service 4 (1959).
129. Pettigrew 6-11.
130. Id. at 22.
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[Negro] adoptive parent at least affords him an experience in the form-
ative years which may provide a firm foundation for later personality
development.
131
That white families can also provide such a supportive home life for a Negro
child is not only arguable in theory but has, in fact, been discovered by those
adoption agencies which have participated in interracial adoptions. The Los
Angeles County Bureau of Adoptions, for example, has reported: 'The white
family that can accept and love a Negro child is more inner-directed and emotion-
ally independent, and for this reason is considered, by our agency, as one of our
best families."' 3 2 An analysis of the 28 families which had adopted 34 Negro
children through the Bureau showed that, for the most part, "their level of ma-
turity has been high, as has been their capacity for frustration tolerance." Well-
educated, often with high-status occupations, they were "found to be warm,
giving and non ethnocentric people, .. .certainly not . . . of marginal eligi-
bility; that is, falling within the group of families that agencies at one time would
not accept." 33 Although there is some concern on the part of many agencies over
the motivations of the white parents interested in adopting Negro children, those
who actually adopt appear to have done so with success. As one agency has
written, "We are strongly in favor of good interracial adoptions because we have
seen them work to the great benefit of the children involved." 34
Besides the significance of the home in a child's development (and perhaps
especially in a Negro child's development), there is a second reason for endors-
ing interracial adoptions even in the face of the tensions they may produce.
American society is currently struggling with an agonizingly difficult "race prob-
lem." Although visible signs do not all point in the same direction, the goal
ahead appears to be greater acceptance of racial integration in many areas of
American life. Individuals who are in the vanguard of this social movement as it
goes along its jolting, jarring way, should be encouraged, not deterred. As one
writer has asked, is it "good public policy to require people who have no preju-
dices to conform to the standards of the prejudiced.... ? [I's it wise to require
the socially healthy to keep step with the socially ill?"18 5 Those white individuals
who want to bring a Negro child into their home should not therefore be limited
by community thinking-unless, for some reason, the child himself will suffer
more in that home than he would otherwise, i.e., in the available alternatives.
The last question is, in fact, raised by the situation which presently exists
in the South. The discussion thus far has largely been predicated on the kind of
situation that predominates in the urban North.18 6 But it must be asked: What
131. D. Fanshel, supra note 13, at 34.
132. E. Branham, supra note 93, at 1.
133. Id. at 4-5.
134. Shepard, supra note 89, at 10-11; Letter from Stuart R. Stimmel, State Dir., The
Boys and Girls Aid Soc. 9f Ore., to author, March 3, 1967.
135. Larrson 73.
136. There is, of course, the happy possibility in the urban north that the family may
already be living in an integrated neighborhood. Where this is the setting, most of the
arguments against interracial adoption lose much of whatever strength they have.
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about the South, where many Negroes continue to live and where the circum-
stances calling for the adoption of unwanted infants may also exist?
Interracial adoption presents a far more difficult question in the South be-
cause of the continued hostility of the Southern white towards any sort of inter-
racial social activity.lar The intensity of this hostility is manifested by the laws
forbidding marriage between Negroes and whites which have only recently been
declared tnconstitutional.138 As a Southern adoption agency has indicated, "A
child reared in a home with parents of a different race will be apt to meet and
want to marry a person of his or her parents' background, not his own." So, at
least in those states where anti-miscegenation laws persisted into the 1960's,
interracial adoption seems likely to receive a reaction similarly hostile to that
accorded interracial marriage.
In the face of such intense hostility, it perhaps becomes unfair to place a
child in a situation where he is likely to suffer for the decision of others. It has
been pointed out that the defenders of anti-miscegenation statutes may have had
their strongest argument in "the likelihood that children of [mixed] marriages
will suffer economically and socially.113 9 The argument is strong because, while
adults may rationally consider the implications of their decision before making it,
the children they bear (or adopt) clearly have no chance to weigh the competing
considerations and yet must face whatever consequences result. In the South,
these could be disastrous. Does this possibility ever justify the refusal to allow
the creation of an interracial home?
One commentator on miscegenation laws wrote in 1966 that solving the
problem of the children of mixed marriages by simply forbidding those marriages
was "about as 'reasonable' as prohibiting child labor by eliminating children."
Instead of making mixed marriages illegal, he argued, those who cause the chil-
dren of those marriages to suffer should be punished for any acts of violence or
discrimination they perpetrate, and programs to educate these hostile members
of society in hopes of changing their attitudes should be promoted. 140
This may indeed be an appropriate response in the case of the children of
miscegenous marriages, for outlawing those marriages merely to prevent injustices
to unborn children-injustices which should themselves be eradicated-represents
an outrageous solution and one unacceptable to the Supreme Court. But the argu-
ment is not nearly so strong when it is applied to adoption, because adoption
presents a rather different case. Adoption is not the natural process by which
children are added to a family, but the deliberate placement of someone else's
child into a new home. Thus where adoption is involved, the basic concern must
be the child's welfare, and for that reason it may be so unwise to put a Negro
child into a white home in the South (assuming, of course, that a home desiring
137, As one Southerner has recently remarked to the author, "Whites don't even have
Negroes as guests in their homes in the South."
138. See infra sec. IV(A)(1).
139. Seidelson, Miscegenation Statutes and the Supreme Court: A Brief Prediction, of
What the Court Will Do and Why, 15 Cath. U.L. Rev. 156, 166 (1966).
140. Id. at 166-70.
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him exists) that it should not, in perhaps a majority of cases, be counseled.1 4 1
Of course, it is possible that tensions in this area will lessen in the South,
as elsewhere, over time. One factor which may contribute in that direction is
judicial approval of interracial marriage (now a fait accompli) and interracial
adoption, 142 for law represents "an ethical norm" which most people are inclined
to follow. 143 However, until tensions are substantially lessened, it would seem
that sentiments in the South on this subject were largely summed up by a South
Carolina attorney when he wrote:
In view of the grave psychological and social problems involved, the
racial similarity between the adopting parents and child should be a
condition precedent to considering other aspects of the child's wel-
fare.1
44
IV. QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The statutes and the practices of adoption agencies and courts already
described demand examination from a constitutional point of view.
A. The Statutes
(1) The Statutes Prohibiting Interracial Adoption
The statutes which forbid interracial adoption in express language (and
probably the statutes which attach harsh consequences to attempts at it, as well)
are of dubious constitutionality. They can be challenged, first, on the ground of
vagueness of application because of vagueness in statutory definition. A statute
must be definite to be valid,145 and it can be argued that the meaning of the
terms, "race," "Negro," and "white," is so unclear as to make the statutes em-
ploying them invalid. This argument has been put forward on occasion where
such terms have been used in other statutes, 46 and it is fortified by the state-
ments of anthropologists that the use or definition of these terms is, in many
cases, wholly arbitrary.147 Where definitions exist, they are generally in terms of
blood, ancestry, appearance, or all three;' 48 and the adequacy of determinations
made under such standards would seem doubtful. But a statute is not unconsti-
tutionally vague "merely because clearer and more precise language might have
been used; the Constitution ... does not require more than that the language
141. "Approval" in the sense of holding their prohibition by statute to be invalid. See
infra Section IV(A) pp. 335-41.
142. A blanket prohibition is still not justified, however; determinations must be made
individually. There may well be communities where an interracial home would be in a
child's best interest, e.g., in a university community.
143. See the discussion of the effect of law on prejudice in Greenberg 2-4, 24-29; see
also G. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 469-477 (1954); A. Rose, Race Prejudice and
Discrimination 554-55 (1951).
144. Pope, Interracial Adoption, 9 S.C.LQ. 630, 632 (1957).
145. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 552 (1966).
146. See M. Cohen, supra note 32, at 9.
147. See letter from Margaret Mead to M. Cohen, id. at 10.
148. Note, An Appraisal of the Legal Tests Used to Determine Who Is A Negro, 34
Cornell L.Q. 246, 247 (1948).
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convey sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practices."'1 49 Perhaps "common understanding
and practices" in the South adequately define who is a Negro and who is not, for
the purposes of these statutes, and therefore validate them as sufficiently precise.
But this is not altogether clear.1' ° The void-for-vagueness argument here is not
strong, but if adoption can be maintained as "a fundamental right," then a certain
precision may be deemed essential in statutes which regulate it.'r'
More significant objections to these statutes can be grounded upon the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
15 2
Due Process
It is generally stated that to invoke the due process clause, "one must have
a right that has been abused or infringed." 15 3 This necessitates a consideration of
whether or not such "rights" are involved in adoption. The argument that child-
less married couples have a right to adopt a child has never been recognized by
the courts, and many workers in the field insist that it is a priviledge.154 But this
view was originally formulated when few children were available for adoption
and agencies could be very selective in choosing among applicants for parent-
hood. If, as the Supreme Court stated in Meyer v. Nebraska,'5 "Without doubt,
[the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes ... the right of
the individual to... marry, establish a home and bring up children. . .," it can be
argued that where there are children available for adoption in excess of the num-
ber of parent-applicants, any married couple who wants to adopt should have the
right to do so. After all, if a couple meet the state's requirements for marriage,
they are presumed to be capable of raising their own children. Merely because
they are biologically unable to produce children themselves, it perhaps should
not follow that an agency of the state may deny them the opportunity to adopt
a child, at least one who would otherwise remain in institutional or foster care.
(An exception would, of course, be made for those couples shown to be unfit for
parenthood.) This view has strong support in the assertions of sociologists that
family life "provides the major source of emotional security" for adults as well
as children in contemporary American society.15
149. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 552 (1966).
150. The problems that may arise where the need exists to make such definitions are
illustrated by Green v. City of New Orleans, 88 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 1956). A child was born
to an unwed white mother, was recorded as white, but with the passage of time began to
exhibit Negro physical characteristics. An anthropologist refused to say that the child
definitely had any "Negro blood," leaving the court to postpone designation of the child's
race until a time "when the child was more developed and mature."
151. Cf. Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 728-31, 198 P.2d 17, 27 (1948).
152. The equal protection argument has been suggested in Comment, supra note 87, at
722-23 n.36.
153. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social Problem, 53 Geo.
LJ. 49, 67 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Applebaum].
154. Foote, Levy & Sander 508.
155. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). That "the freedom to marry" is "one of the vital
personal rights necessary to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men" was more
recently articulated in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
156. J. Udry, supra note 2, at 10, 18.
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Even if no parental right to adopt a child can be maintained, perhaps--where
there are prospective adoptors-the unwanted child has a "right" to be adopted.
That is, every child, insofar as possible, is entitled to the security and other ad-
vantages of a home and family. As one authority has written, the family, more
than any other single institution, "determines what kind of life a child will grow
into and what his chances will be to amount to something or nothing."'157 Where
a child is deprived of a stable family life, he does not undergo "the socialization
which only a family can provide" and his personality development and his adjust-
ment to society are "handicapped."' 58 Perhaps such deprivation can be viewed
as deprivation of a right, at least where the possibility of a family life for the
child is kept from him solely by statute.
Even if these "rights" are not deemed fundamental, the concept of due
process nevertheless has been held to impose certain requirements of basic fairness
on state legislation. 159 To meet the standards of due process, legislation must
have a reasonable basis and be reasonably related to a legitimate legislative pur-
pose.160 There must, therefore, be a legislative finding that it is reasonable, in
deciding a child's future, to believe that racial matching bears some relationship
to the welfare of the child. Further, even where such a finding has been made, it
must be shown to be reasonable to give that factor controlling weight.' 61 While
it is undeniable that race may reasonably be considered important in the place-
ment of a child, it is not conclusive that identity of race between parent and
child should be the overriding consideration. 162 Where its application as such an
overriding factor results in a placement less satisfactory in terms of the child's
overall welfare, or in no placement at all, due process would seem to have been,
violated.
Equal Protection of the Laws
The equal protection standard is more concrete; and also somwhat more
relevant where racial classifications are involved. Its test, like that of due pro-
cess, is essentially one of reasonableness: 1 63 the equal protection clause requires
the states to "exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhab-
itants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of
regulation."' 6 4 The question is, therefore, whether or not the statutory classifica-
tion is reasonable. There are arguments which would seem to support a determi-
nation of reasonableness, e.g., that a child in an interracial home will face diffi-
culties, and where it appears that there may be some rational basis for state
157. Id.
158. E. Frazier, quoted in The Negro Family 48.
159. Applebaum 68.
160. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
161. Cf. List, A Child and a Wall: A Study of "Religious Protection" Laws, 13 Buffalo
L. Rev. 9, 49-50 (1963).
162. See supra sec. III pp. 325-35.
163. Id. at 51.
164. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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legislation, a presumption ordinarily operates in favor of its validity. 03 However,
these statutes involve a racial classification, and such statutes have come to be
treated differently by the courts. Indeed, the presumption is shifted, and the
state is required to prove the reasonableness of the classification. A recent case
exemplifying this approach is McLaughlin v. Florida,'01 where the Supreme
Court declared a Florida statute invalid under the equal protection clause be-
cause it punished interracial couples for cohabitation in situations where other
couples were not so punished. According to Mr. Justice White's majority opinion,
judicial inquiry under the equal protection clause requires that the courts decide
"whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its
purpose." Normally "the widest discretion is allowed the legislative judgment,"
but a classification based upon the race of the participants deserves special ex-
amination. Because the "central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States,"
racial classifications are " 'constitutionally suspect,' and subject to the 'most
rigid scrutiny,' and 'in most circumstances irrelevant' to any constitutionally
acceptable legislative purpose."'1 67 Because the Court could find nothing to
justify different treatment for interracial couples, it held such statutes as Flor-
ida's "invalid as a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment."' 0 s
More recently, in Loving v. Virginia,' 9 the Court announced that statutory
schemes adopted by a state to prevent marriages between persons solely on the
basis of racial classifications "cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 70 Referring to McLaughlin, the Court noted that where "we deal
with statutes containing racial classifications,... the fact of equal application [to
both races] does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justi-
fication which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state
statutes drawn according to race." 17' If racial classifications are ever to be up-
held,
they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some
permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination




The Court concluded that "patently no legitimate overriding purpose indepen-
dent of invidious racial discrimination" justified the racial classification in the
Virginia miscegenation provisions under examination. "There can be no doubt
165. Applebaum 78-85.
166. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
167. Id. at 191-92. (Footnotes omitted).
168. Id. at 184.
169. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
170. Id. at 2.
171. Id. at 9.
172. Id. at 11.
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that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications vio-
lates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." 173
The McLaughlin and Loving decisions may have special relevance here.
Statutes governing adoption can be likened to those governing marriage and
marriage-like relationships, since they all focus upon social units in which the
state has a legitimate interest. The Supreme Court has said in McLaughlin that
the general purpose of the Florida statute--"to prevent breaches of the basic
concepts of sexual decency"---did not require separate or different treatment for
interracial couples. 174 Similarly, it can be argued that the purpose of any adop-
tion statute must be to benefit the welfare of the individual child, and since every
child is unique-his uniqueness is not determined solely or even predominantly
along racial lines-separate treatment of an adoption merely because it involves
different racial backgrounds is neither required nor proper.
There is a further argument. In declaring racial segregation in the public
schools a denial of equal protection,175 the Supreme Court premised its decision
in part on the "importance of education to our democratic society":
It is the very foundation of good citizenship... a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later pro-
fessional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment.17
6
Surely these roles-as well as others-are played by the family, usually to a
greater extent than by the school. Since the Court went on to say in Brown that
"where the state has undertaken to provide [such an opportunity, it] is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms, '177 it can also be argued that
providing homes for those children who need them must be done on equal terms
as well. The equal treatment of the races, moreover, is not enough: each indi-
vidual child must be treated equally.'
78
Arguments to the contrary are not decisive. The contention that racial ten-
sion may be heightened is probably insufficient to sustain a statute: "It would
permit the majority race to maintain a racial restriction simply by threatening
violence if the restriction were removed."'1 79 Injury to the child's personality
development where interracial adoption takes place may be predicted by some,
but it is equally easy to predict a more healthy development, at least along cer-
tain lines. Harm to the family is not inevitable, and where its nature permits,
such harm should be in any case prevented by legal means.
The shift in presumption generally made in this area may not even be neces-
sary, if, as one writer maintains, statutes "with racial categories, even under the
173. Id. at 11-12.
174. 379 U.S. at 193.
175. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
176. Id. at 493.
177. Id.
178. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
179. Applebaum 77 and cases cited.
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rational-basis test, can still be struck down if they are shown to be either a stamp
of inferiority upon a particular race or to be based upon racial hostility."
1 80
Hints of this argument are evident in the Loving decision. Regardless of its
merits, the presumption is, in fact, against reasonableness, and it must be met by
more conclusive arguments than those noted here if it is to be overcome.
It may be useful at this point to compare the treatment of the statutes
found in a related area of law: adoption statutes containing "religious protection"
provisions. These provisions, when strictly interpreted, are analogous to the
statutes prohibiting interracial adoption. In the absence of statutory provision,
religious "matching" of parents and child appears to be the common practice,
although there is considerable flexibility. A number of statutes mention the re-
ligion of the parties (sometimes along with race) as a factor to be considered in
judging an adoption's suitability.' 8 ' Finally, eleven states require religious
matching "when practicable." This phrase is given three interpretations: it is
given no real significance; it is interpreted liberally; or-notably in New York
and Massachusetts-it is interpreted strictly. 8 2 This last, mandatory interpreta-
tion, which requires religious matching in virtually every case, causes these
statutes to resemble the statutes requiring racial matching, and, like them, they
raise a constitutional question.
"Religious protection" in adoption' 83 is both more and less objectionable
than required racial matching. It is more objectionable in that (1) it may involve
a violation of the first amendment, as well as the fourteenth; (2) imputing a reli-
gion to a child at birth is an artificial procedure, and restricting a child's possi-
bilities of placement by such an imputation may be an unwarranted interference
with his best interests, while a child's race or color at birth is a fact and an im-
mutable one (at least where he has distinctive racial characteristics of any
sort); (3) America's diverse religious groups far more commonly engage in inter-
marriage and other shared activities in the society than do the different racial
groups; tensions between religious groups are not very great when compared
with racial tensions; and in general, the significance allotted to religion in Ameri-
can society does not approach that allotted to race.
"Religious protection" is at the same time less objectionable than required
racial matching in that it appears to have a relatively less adverse impact on
any particular child's chances for adoption. While a Catholic child, for example,
may have somewhat more difficulty in being placed in a Catholic home than he
would have in being placed if Protestant and Jewish homes were also open to
him, his difficulty pales beside that faced by the Negro child who can only be
placed in a Negro home. The result is that a much higher proportion of Negro
180. Applebaum 86 and cases cited.
181. Race appears to be mentioned with less frequency in these statutes but given
greater weight in practice.
182. List, supra note 161, at 21-24.
1183. See the discussion of these provisions in List, supra note 161, and Ramsey, The
Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceedings, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 649
(1959).
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children are shunted off into institutions or foster homes, with all of their atten-
dant consequences. Further, drawing racial distinctions in a statute implies, far
more than "religious protection" ever can, that one of the races (the one which
has made the law) considers itself superior to the other. This has been inherent
in such legislation since the first "Jim Crow" law, and as one commentator has
written of miscegenation statutes:
Antiamalgamation laws are caste laws. They clearly imply that the Ne-
gro [and other nonwhite persons] are inferior peoples with whom
association on an intimate level is anathema.184
The inspiration for laws prohibiting interracial adoption can hardly have been
much different.
Although the argument made against the constitutionality of religious pro-
tection laws is strong, the Supreme Court has refused to review a case which
clearly presented the issue.18 5 The court's reluctance to rule on such a question
would perhaps trigger a refusal to consider the constitutionality of mandatory
racial matching as well. In any case the actual significance of holding the statu-
tory prohibition of interracial adoption unconstitutional would be minimal, at
least initially, because practice in this area would be slow to change. 186
(2) The Statutes Making Race a Relevant Consideration
Those statutes which, without prohibiting interracial adoption, in some way
point to race as a relevant factor cannot easily be said to be unconstitutional.
Although these statutes, by suggesting that racial considerations be given some
weight by court or agency, "raise the possibility that an unconstitutional criterion
is sought to be applied, ' 187 this alone does not seem to be enough to condemn
them as a fortiori invalid. After all, "the intimacy and emotion involved in
... adoption proceedings can properly justify" the consideration of such factors
as race, religion, or national origin, since-wisely or not-these may be (and are)
viewed by some as bearing a reasonable relation to the ends sought by adop-
tion. 88 Race is not singled out in these statutes as the sole criterion on which
decisions must be based, and the ordinary presumption in favor of state legisla-
tion is therefore probably applicable. Nevertheless, if it can be shown that race
alone is looked to as a basis for differentiation (and that all other factors are
largely ignored), the argument is tenable that these statutes are, in effect,
applied like those which expressly prohibit interracial adoption, and are there-
fore, like them, of doubtful constitutionality.
184. C. Larrson, Preface to Marriage Across the Color Line at viii (C. Larrson ed.
1965).
185. Matter of Goldman, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
924 (1955).
186. See the discussion of this practice in infra subsec. (B) pp. 342-47.
187. Comment, supra note 87, at 722-23 n.36.
188. List, supra note 161, at 52.
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B. The Practices
Within the category of practices belong the practices of social agencies in
handling adoptions, judicial decisions made under non-prohibitory adoption stat-
utes, and judicial decisions in the area of child custody. As in the above discus-
sion of statutes, the focus here will be upon the constitutionality of these practices
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
The fourteenth amendment provides that:
no State shall . .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.189
To maintain a claim under these clauses, therefore, "state action" is required.
One clear instance of state action is a state statute. Action by an agency of the
state or by an individual, such as a state officer, supported by state authority
also constitutes state action.10 Public, state-supported social agencies providing
adoption services are clearly within this category. Similarly, "the action of state
courts and of judicial officers in their official capacities is... regarded as action
of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."'' Under this
view, judicial decisions in the area may also be covered.
The sole remaining category is that of the private agencies which handle
adoptions. There are two approaches by which their activities may, like the
others, be viewed as "state action."
(1) A line of Supreme Court decisions has found state action in certain
"private" activities where the state has become involved to a "significant extent."
This line of cases includes Marsh v. Alabama,102 where a company-owned town
was held subject to the same constitutional restraints regarding free speech as a
public body; Terry v. Adams,'0 3 where the primary election activities of a pri-
vate political organization were required to meet fifteenth amendment stan-
dards; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 0 4 where exclusion of a Negro
from the restaurant of a state agency's lessee was deemed discriminatory state
action; and Mr. Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Lombard v. Louisiana,19
which argued that state licensing and surveillance of a business serving the public
makes it "an instrumentality of the State since the State charges it with duties
to the public and supervises its performance."' 0 6 Perhaps the trend of these
cases has been summarized in Evans v. Newton,0 7 where Mr. Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, stated,
189. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. (Emphasis added.)
190. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
191. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).
192. 326 U.S. 501 (1945).
193. 34$ U.S. 461 (1953).
194. 369 U.S. 715 (1961).
195. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
196. Id. at 282-83.
197. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
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. . . when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or
instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limita-
tions.198
The Evans decision is far from sweeping, however; it calls for both a "public
character" in the undertaking and some involvement by the state in its opera-
tion (in the past, if not in the present).'99
The work of a private adoption agency can arguably be fitted within this
doctrine. Typically, the agency is licensed by the state and, in addition, per-
forms a number of functions in the adoption process for the state: it cares for
neglected children, it makes investigations of and reports on the "suitability"
of an adoption for the courts, and so on. Its own placements must be reported
to the state child welfare agency and are supervised by the courts. Very much
like the private political party in Terry v. Adams, the agency's activities are
geared into state processes; like the private trustees of the park in Evans v.
Newton, it is exercising functions of a public nature.
It can, of course, be argued that the private agency stands in the place of
the child's parent-especially where the mother has surrendered her child to a
particular agency and has authorized it to place the child for her. Since a par-
ent is deemed to have unrestricted control over the child's disposition, so also,
the argument runs, should the agency. One writer has responded to this con-
tention by saying that the agency does not stand fully in loco parentis, with the
mother's power to give or withhold consent, because a child in the custody of
an agency is under the parens patriae power of the state. "Agencies, whether
public or 'private,' are in the adoption proceedings creatures of statutory law"
and subordinate to the courts, wherein the parens patriae power is vested.
200
Under this view, the mother might be required to make explicit any restrictions
she desires; in the absence of these, even private agencies might then be for-
bidden from using racial classifications in this area.
On the other hand, extension of the Evans v. Newton doctrine into an area
so intensely personal as adoption services seems questionable. "[T]he fact that
government has engaged in a particular activity does not necessarily mean that
an individual entrepreneur or manager of the same kind of undertaking suffers
the same constitutional inhibitions."120 1 Like private schools, private adoption
agencies may-at least for the present-remain free from such inhibitions.
(2) Shelley v. Kraemer20 2 held that the public endorsement (by court
enforcement) of a private restriction based on race was a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws. That doctrine could perhaps be extended to cover the judicial
sanction of a private agency's refusal to make interracial placements. However,
198. Id. at 299.
199. Id. at 302.
200. Ramsey, supra note 183, at 687. (Emphasis in original.)
201. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966).
202. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Shelley involved a willing buyer and a willing seller, both prevented from
fulfilling their transaction by court enforcement of a restrictive covenant. The
situation may be somewhat different where parent-applicants are willing to
adopt a child of another race but the child's willingness to the adoption is not
determinable. In any event, the Court has not indicated any enthusiasm for
extending the Shelley doctrine in recent years;2 03 reliance upon the first ap-
proach, if any, would therefore seem preferable.
If, then, there is state action at all these levels in the adoption process (at
least arguably where private agencies are involved), can it also be maintained
that such action denies due process or equal protection when the factor of race
is given controlling weight? Maintaining such an argument is difficult, in light
of the two highly-generalized standards recognized as the guidelines in this area.
It has already been noted that the courts generally adhere to the criterion
of the "best interests" or the "welfare" of the child in making adoption and
custody decisions. Adoption agencies, for their part, have traditionally followed
the principle of "matching" in making their placements. The question there-
fore becomes: When can these standards be challenged as masking an uncon-
stitutional exercise of discretion?
In the case of the agencies, "matching" has been upheld by the courts
even where a court has felt that another outcome might be preferable.204 It
appears that, whether or not an agency wishes to adhere to matching as a guid-
ing precept, there is a general reluctance on the part of the courts to override
agency decisions. Even where applicants believe that race was the decisive fac-
tor in refusing them a desired child, where the agency which has refused them
denies that race was decisive, a court is unlikely to order the agency to make
the requested placement. 205 As a result, it is largely a function of agency initi-
ative whether their standards of child placement undergo any change or not.
In this spirit, Schapiro has urged that social agencies "help courts arrive at
good decisions."206 But how they choose to do this depends, of course, upon what
they view as a "good decision." Those agencies influenced by the prejudices in
their communities will presumably decide differently from those preferring to
follow other influences. Public agencies may have more freedom to disregard the
matching mystique in a community where the pressures of prejudice are not
great and, in particular, where a statute supports that disregard, while private
agencies are perhaps more free to innovate than their public counterparts in
communities dominated by prejudice. 20
7
What about judicial decisions? As a recent commentator has pointed out,
203. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), is one case where
the court might have extended Shelley but did not.
204. Crump v. Montgomery, 220 Md. 515, 154 A.2d 802 (1959), 224 Md. 470, 168
A2d 355 (1961).
205. See Rockefeller v. Nickerson, 36 Misc. 2d 869, 233 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
206. 1 Schapiro 106.
207. See analysis in G. Alport, supra note 143, at 461-62. To some extent, the question-
naire results, supra pp. 321-23, bear out this thesis.
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a difficulty with relying exclusively on the "welfare of the child" standard arises
"when the parents' political or religious beliefs or racial characteristics are
claimed to be contrary to the child's best interest. It would seem that in most
cases these factors are irrelevant to the child's emotional well-being."
208 How-
ever, when a decision is couched in terms of the child's "best interest," it is diffi-
cult to prove that race was given undue consideration-unless the judge himself
articulates that it has been the decisive factor. Perhaps judges who want a de-
cision based upon race to stand will take their cues from a case like Fountaine
v. Fountaine20 9 (especially if they compare it with Murphy or Potter21
0 ) and
will not articulate that race was the controlling consideration. A more optimis-
tic prediction is that judges may heed Fountaine-like decisions (at least in those
jurisdictions where they are made) and actually cease to use race as the govern-
ing criterion.
Fountaine may well mark the trend of future decisions. One who considers
himself the victim of a decision based solely upon race certainly can appeal to
it as precedent, along with Matter of the Adoption of Bakeri21 and In Re
Adoption of a Minor. 12 Of course, no one should be compelled to adopt a child
of another race where he does not wish to; discriminations made by prospective
parents are appropriate because they are highly relevant to the parents' rela-
tionship with the child. At the same time, the courts of a state must not inter-
fere unduly where parents affirmatively want to adopt a child of another race.
The rule enunciated in In Re Adoption of a Minor, i.e., that race may
be a relevant factor in determining where a child's welfare lies, but "that
factor alone cannot be decisive," may be, Greenberg suggests, "assimilated to"
a constitutional rule.21 3 Despite the possible unconstitutionality of using race
as a decisive consideration in both adoption and custody proceedings, the Su-
preme Court will almost unquestionably avoid entering this area of decision
to formulate its own rule for some time. The Court's refusal to review a recent
controversial custody determination,21 4 a case presenting the issue of "re-
ligious protection" laws, 215 and, until 1966, several cases challenging miscege-
nation statutes21 0 seems to indicate a high degree of reluctance to move into the
area of family law, one area where the states' sovereignty not only is highly
cherished, but also, to a considerable degree, remains intact.
V. CONCLUSION
A brief conclusion may serve to tie together some of the different threads
running through this article. First, it is maintained that interracial adoption
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should nowhere be illegal under statute. Racial discrimination in an adoption
statute is as fully unconstitutional as any other form of racial discrimination
given statutory expression. At the same time, it is recognized that interracial
placements may, for social reasons, be slow to come about, particularly in the
South. The ultimate standard must always be the child's "best interest," and
where that standard would not be met in an interracial home, practice under
the statute should (and probably will) be geared to make the wisest decision
for each individual child.
The preferred statute, of course, would be one making no mention of race.
This is, in fact, the form of both the Uniform Adoption Act and the model adop-
tion act proposed by the United States Children's Bureau.2 17 Under such an
act, agencies and courts are free to act on behalf of the welfare of the child
without statutory restrictions. A suggested standard: the rule of In Re Adop-
tion of a Minor, interpreted as liberally as social considerations in the commu-
nity will allow.
One solution for the unwanted Negro children who face a substantially
more hostile reception from the white community in the South than that faced
elsewhere may be that proposed by Schapiro in 1957 and apparently underway
ten years later: a National Adoption Resource Exchange, a national "clearing
house" to facilitate the placement of children from areas of the country where
they are unwanted to those where they are welcomed. 218 Even in the North,
however, wholesale adoption of Negro children by white parents is unlikely-
and, indeed, is probably unwise. While race should clearly not be the sole, de-
cisive factor in the placement of a child, adoption may be one of those very few
areas where race should not be totally disregarded either. There will always be
cases where differences in race should, perhaps must be considered if the "best
interest of the child" is to prevail.
The problems in this area are evident. If law supports the creation of in-
terracial homes through adoption and custody arrangements, it may encourage
the establishment of more such homes and may have a benevolent influence upon
attitudes towards them. Still, interracial placements-unless undertaken on a
massive scale (and perhaps even then)-stand little chance of having any sig-
nificant impact on America's racial difficulties. A Negro essayist has written that
the Negro is "the most despised creature in his country" and that
there is simply no possibility of a real change in the Negro's situation
without the most radical and far-reaching changes in the American po-
litical and social structure.
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Nevertheless, if even one child in an interracial home finds love and acceptance
217. Greenberg 399; U.S. Children's Bureau, Pub. No. 394-1961, Legislative Guides for
the Termination of Parental Rights and Responsibilities and the Adoption of Children 49-56
(1961).
218. 3 Schapiro 46; N.Y. Times, June 19, 1966, at 72, col. 2.
219. J. Baldwin, supra note 126, at 99.
ADOPTION AND CUSTODY
where he might have found neither, and if he grows to a sounder maturity as a
result, then interracial adoption and custody placements will have served a use-
ful purpose in American society.

